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Optimal Collusion with Limited Liability and Policy Implications
Abstract
Collusion sustainability depends on firms’ aptitude to impose sufficiently severe punishments
in case of deviation from the collusive rule. We extend results from the literature on optimal
collusion by investigating the role of limited liability. We examine all situations in which either
structural conditions (demand and technology), financial considerations (a profitability target), or
institutional circumstances (a regulation) set a lower bound, possibly negative, to firms’ profits.
For a large class of repeated games with discounting, we show that, absent participation and
limited liability constraints, there exists a unique optimal penal code. It commands a severe
single-period punishment immediately after a firm deviates from the collusive stage-game strategy.
When either the participation constraint or the limited liability constraint bind, there exists an
infinity of multi-period optimal punishment paths that permit firms to implement the collusive
strategy. The usual front-loading scheme is only a specific case, an optimal punishment profile
can take the form of a price asymmetric cycle, and a longer punishment is not always a perfect
substitute for more immediate severity. Limiting further firms’ liability may actually result in
more efficient markets and can be used as a regulatory instrument. Absent collusion, introducing
a price floor slightly below the observed transaction price has no impact on firms’ behavior.
However, the floor makes collusive equilibria unsustainable.
JEL Classification: C72, D43, L13
Keywords: Collusion, Oligopoly, Limited Liability, Competition Policy
1 Introduction
In this paper, we characterize the ability of oligopolistic firms to implement a collusive strategy
when their ability to punish deviations over one or several periods is limited.
Firms in the same industry may increase profits by coordinating the prices they charge or
the quantities they sell. In a legal context in which collusive agreements cannot be overtly en-
forced, and future profits are discounted, it is well-known that an impatient firm may find it
privately profitable to deviate from a collusive strategy. This renders collusive agreements funda-
mentally unstable. However, firms may design non-cooperative discipline mechanisms that help
implementing collusion.
Many papers examine the structural conditions that facilitate the formation of cartels. Most
theoretical analyses rely on a class of dynamic models usually referred to as supergames. These
models feature a repeated market game in which firms maximize a flow of discounted individual
profits by non-cooperatively choosing a price or a quantity over an infinite number of periods.
When a deviation can be credibly and sufficiently “punished” via lower industry prices or larger
quantities in subsequent time periods, conditions on structural parameters can be derived which,
when satisfied, make collusion stable.
A majority of recent contributions to the literature investigate the impact of various model
specifications on the sustainability of collusion with stick-and-carrot mechanisms in the style of
Abreu (1986, 1988). In this category of mechanisms, if a firm deviates from collusion, all firms
play a punishment strategy over one or several periods — the stick — which is more severe than
Nash reversion (i.e., it leads to lower instantaneous profits, possibly negative) before returning
to a collusive price or quantity. If a deviation occurs in a punishment period, the punishment
phase restarts, otherwise all firms resume the collusive behavior to earn supernormal profits — the
carrot. More specifically, Abreu (1986) exploits a single-period punishment mechanism for a class
of repeated quantity-setting oligopoly stage games with symmetric sellers of a homogenous good,
constant positive marginal costs, and no fixed cost. For a given discount factor, the most severe
punishment strategy — following a deviation either from the collusive path or from a punishment
rule — that sustains collusion, is characterized. It results in the highest level of discounted collusive
profits.
The analysis of the connection between structural conditions and collusion stability with a
stick-and-carrot mechanism à la Abreu has been extended to many aspects. They include the
case of multi-market contact (Bernheim and Whinston (1990)). Collusion is facilitated when the
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same firms are present on several markets. Capacity constraints have been considered (in par-
ticular Lambson (1987, 1994), Compte, Jenny, Rey (2002)). A general message is that limited
and asymmetric capacities make collusion more difficult to sustain. Other papers focus on cost
heterogeneity (including Rothschild (1999), Vasconcelos (2005), Miklós-Thal (2011)). It is found
that collusion is more difficult to sustain when costs are asymmetric, and that collusion sustain-
ability depends on the difference between the marginal cost levels that characterize both the less
and the most efficient firms in the industry. Another research stream focuses on circumstances in
which each firm receives a cost shock in each period of a repeated price-setting game with infinite
horizon (notably Athey et al. (2001, 2004, 2008)). An important result is that, when marginal
costs are private information and may differ across firms, and under simple and general assump-
tions, ex ante cartel payoffs are maximized when firms charge the same collusive price and share
the market equally, as in simpler models with complete information and symmetric firms. Other
contributions, which do not always allow for the possibility of pricing below marginal costs, in-
vestigate the impact of changes in demand, with various specifications for the dynamics of shocks
(see, in particular, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991), Bagwell
and Staiger (1997)). A “tuned” collusive price gets closer to the competitive level when demand
is high.1
Our objective is to enrich the study of the circumstances that facilitate collusion, or make it
more difficult to sustain. This is done by investigating the exact role of an assumption, in the
seminal paper by Abreu (1986), according to which the price is strictly positive for all levels of
industry output, so that there is no floor for firms’ losses when the constant marginal cost is also
specified above zero. Indeed the quantity sold — and related costs — tend to infinity when firms
charge below the marginal cost and the price approaches zero. In that case, the single-period
punishment that follows a deviation can be made as severe as needed. Although the strategy set
is assumed to be finite, the upper bound to the available quantities is so high as to never be used
as a punishment action that sustains collusion.
To our knowledge, most papers — if not all — that refer to Abreu (1986, 1988) actually overlook
this key assumption by introducing more structure. They typically borrow the same stick-and-
carrot mechanism with a single punishment period, although they either assume that demand is
finite at all prices, or that firms have limited production capacity. It follows that losses are bounded
from below in a punishment period, and collusion can be hindered. In that case, an extension
of the punishment phase to several periods appears as a natural substitute for more immediate
severity. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 165) emphasize that, when the severity of punishments
1For a comprehensive survey of the literature on the factors that facilitate collusion, see Motta (2004).
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is limited the punishment phase should be longer, although “it is not obvious precisely which
actions should be specified” in the punishment phase. Our paper is novel in that it thoroughly
examines this point. This is done in a setup that encompasses the main assumptions in Abreu
(1986). In our model, firms sell substitutable goods (possibly differentiated), inverse demand
functions are non-increasing (they can be finite at all prices), the marginal cost is constant and
non-negative (it can be zero), and there can be a fixed cost. In addition to standard incentive and
participation constraints, a key specification that we introduce is the limited liability constraint,
which amounts to imposing a limitation on the lowest level of profits a firm may earn. Whether
the limited liability constraint binds or not impacts firms’ choices of price or quantity in the
punishment phase.
Interestingly, a limited liability constraint is not a technical sophistication that we add to
standard specifications. It is de facto present, or latent, in all models where demand or techno-
logical conditions set a lower bound to firms’ losses. A finite demand, or a limited capacity, are
examples of structural specifications that constrain firms’ payoffs to remain above a certain (non-
positive) level. Then, firms’ losses also remain finite when the prices they charge are below their
unit costs of production. This limits the maximal severity of punishment schemes. In this case, a
firm with high fixed and/or variable costs earns more negative payoffs during aggressive pricing
episodes than more efficient firms. This offers a new explanation for an empirical observation by
Symeonidis (2003), who finds strong evidence that collusion is more likely in industries with high
capital intensity. This result has been interpreted as a consequence of high barriers to entry.2
Another possible and more direct interpretation, which we investigate below, is that high average
costs — which permit severe punishments — facilitate collusion.
To illustrate, consider for example a linear and symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly.3 The
non negative unit cost of production c is constant, and firm i’s inverse demand function in each
period is the non negative part of pi(qi, qj) = 1−qi−γ(n−1)qj , where pi is the price it charges, qi
is the quantity it sells, qj is the quantity sold by each competitor, and γ is a measure of product
substitutability. In this standard model, the limited liability constraint is not a specification we
add. It is already rooted in the usual assumption that the quantity demanded is finite at all
prices, which cannot be negative. Hence the severity of punishments is limited. We establish
that the limitation plays no role for all admissible values of c and γ only if there are exactly
two or three firms. In that case, the results obtained in the related literature with a duopoly
2 In Symeonidis (2003), the capital stock of the average plant, and the capital-labor ratio, are proxies for high
barriers to entry, which in turn are seen to facilitate collusion. See also Levenstein and Suslow (2006).
3This example is studied extensively in Section 5.
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and a constant marginal (and unit) cost normalized to zero are robust to the introduction of
a positive marginal cost. In all other cases, that is, with more than three firms, the limited
liability constraint binds for some values of the cost and differentiation parameters. This was not
found in past theoretical studies, although the intuition for that result appears in an exploratory
note by Lambertini and Sasaki (2001, p. 119), who explain that “high marginal costs tend to
provide more room for tacit collusion than ... with lower marginal costs, due to the positive price
constraint.” Moreover, introducing a positive fixed cost reduces the parameter subset in which
the limited liability constraint binds; therefore, a high unit cost facilitates collusion. When the
limited liability constraint binds, we establish that the lowest discount value for which collusion
can be implemented decreases when the number of firms decreases, and either differentiation or
the marginal cost increases. This extends existing results to situations in which there is a limited
liability constraint, and it also emphasizes that all factors enhancing the firms’ ability to punish
— in that they relax the limited liability constraint — facilitate collusion.
It is also well-known that financial parameters (e.g., a return on investment target) may also
shape the limited liability constraint. For example, prudential ratios set a limit to the quantity
of loans a bank may supply. Another example is that financial markets constrain managers of
equity-dependent firms not to post low operational profits for too long. The empirical literature
has evidenced the connection between stock prices and firms’ investments, as in Baker et al.
(2003). Our theoretical analysis establishes that there is also a link between financial constraints
and the ability to collude.
Finally, the limited liability constraint can capture all real-world contexts in which institu-
tional circumstances (e.g., regulation) impact firms’ behavior. An example of a regulatory measure
that reduces the severity of punishments is a price floor. As it rules out severe punishments, it
should hinder collusion. In an empirical paper, Gagné et al. (2006) study the impact on prices of
a price floor established by the Quebec provincial government on the retail market for gasoline.
By limiting the severity of price wars, the floor was seen as a means to reduce the ability of firms
to punish retailers deviating from a high price strategy. The analysis reveals that the net effect of
the floor on average price-cost margins is near zero. The impact of the floor on retail prices in low
margin periods (or price wars) is actually offset by the rise in their average duration. Price wars
are less severe, but they last longer.4 Our analysis offers theoretical grounds to these empirical
4The introduction of a price floor followed a price war. The local association of independent gasoline retailers
reported that the price war “resulted in retail prices that were observed well below wholesale prices. It was so severe
as to force several independent retailers either to close down temporarily or to exit the market” (translated from
the Mémoire de l’Association Québécoise des Indépendants du Pétrole, June 1998, pp. 7-8). In another empirical
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findings.
In this paper, by delineating the largest parameter space for which a collusive strategy can be
implemented, we fully characterize the conditions under which the limited liability constraint does
reduce the firms’ ability to implement a given collusive action (a price or a quantity), in a large
class of models where the duration of punishments can be adjusted. For given cost and demand
parameters, the optimal punishment path is defined as a vector of prices or quantities, played
period after period, that let firms implement a given collusive strategy for the lowest admissible
discount factor. When only incentive constraints are at play, there is a unique optimal punishment
path.
When the limited liability constraint is slack, we find that the possibility to punish over several
periods does not result in a lower threshold for the discount factor than with a single-period
punishment scheme that we use as a benchmark. This also holds with a binding participation
constraint. The latter specifies a minimum continuation payoff following a deviation, but says
nothing on the distribution of this payoff over time.
When the limited liability constraint binds, we find that there exists an infinity of simple
punishment paths that permit firms to implement the collusive strategy. The lowest discount
factor for which a given collusive strategy can be implemented strictly decreases if the punishment
phase is not limited to a single period. We establish that this discount threshold is always reached
with a punishment phase of finite length. Only in particular circumstances, which we characterize,
the discount threshold is as low as in the case without the limited liability constraint. In all other
cases, the discount threshold remains strictly higher than in the absence of a limited liability
constraint. This means that, although the duration of the punishment phase is not bounded, the
limited liability constraint still handicaps the firms’ ability to collude. In other words, a longer
punishment with discounting offers only an imperfect substitute for more immediate severity.
At a theoretical level, the main lesson of the paper is thus that models of collusion, when
they do not take into account the (latent) limited liability constraint, usually exaggerate the
sustainability of collusive agreements. At the policy level, the implication is straightforward,
although it goes against common wisdom. In the context of our model, all attempts that amount
to limiting further the firms’ liability improve market efficiency. Depending on the circumstances
under scrutiny, this can take the form of a cost reduction, better control of predatory pricing, or
a higher profitability target.
analysis of the impact of this regulation, Houde (2008) finds that the minimum retail price floor had a significant
impact on the firms’ option value of staying in the market.
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More specifically, we exploit our theoretical results to design a very simple regulatory mecha-
nism which uses only prima facie observable information to restore competition. The regulation
introduces a price floor slightly below the observed transaction price, and thereby merely rules
out extreme variations in prices. If firms do not collude, the constraint simply does not impact
the firms’ non-collusive actions. Only in case of collusion, the constraint necessarily induces a
change in firms’ behavior. It allows the regulator to drive the industry to the stage-game Nash
equilibrium by iteration.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In Section
3, we restrict the duration of a punishment phase to a single period and identify the largest space
of parameters for which a collusive strategy can be implemented. In Section 4, we obtain the
main results by investigating the impact of punishing over several periods on the firms’ ability to
collude. In section 5, the latter results are illustrated in the context of a linear Cournot model.
In Section 6, we discuss our results in the light of the related literature. Finally, in Section 7 we
construct the regulatory mechanism. Intermediate results, and detailed proofs, are relegated to
the appendix.
2 The Model
We construct a supergame, in which symmetric firms in N = {1, . . . , n} supply substitutable
goods, possibly differentiated, to maximize individual intertemporal profits by simultaneously
and non-cooperatively choosing a strategy ai — or “action” — that is either a price or a quantity
in an infinitely repeated stage game over t = 1, 2, ...,∞. Each firm’s action set A is an interval
of R+. The discount factor δ = 1/(1 + r), where r is the single-period interest rate, is common
to all firms. The continuous function πi : R2+ → R+ relates firm i’s profits to a vector of actions
a ≡ (ai, a−i), where a−i describes a symmetric action chosen by all firms in N\{i}. We omit the
subscript i and specify a single argument a, which is a scalar, to represent the profits π(a) earned
by firms that all choose the same action. Similarly, we denote by πdi (a) the profits firm i earns
when it “deviates”, in that it plays its best reply to a, as played by all other firms. The set of
available actions includes a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategy aNE, implicitly
defined by πdi (aNE) − π(aNE) = 0, all i, and a collusive action, am, which yields more profits
(when am = a∗m, it maximizes joint profits, a case of “perfect” collusion, as in the example we
present in Section 5). Firms’ actions may differ from period to period. An action path {at}∞t=1 is
defined as an infinite stream of n-dimensional vectors of actions, as chosen by each firm in each
period.
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We give more structure to the analysis by relating each firm i’s profits πi = piqi − C (qi),
where pi is a price qi a quantity, to the exact properties of cost and demand conditions. There
are three basic assumptions:
(A1) Firms incur a fixed cost f ≥ 0, and a variable cost c (qi) ≥ 0, to sell substitutable goods
(possibly differentiated), and their strategic variable is either a (non-negative) price (a = p
in the Bertrand specification) or quantity (a = q in the Cournot specification).
(A2) Firm i’s inverse demand function pi : Rn+ → R+ is non-increasing and continuous.
(A3) pi (0) > c and limqi→∞ pi (qi,q−i) = 0, any q−i in R
n−1
+ .
The main features of our model appear clearly when compared with the specifications in Abreu
(1986), a reference, where the following three assumptions hold: ( eA1) Firms sell a homogeneous
good at constant marginal cost c > 0, and their strategic variable is quantity; ( eA2) The market
inverse demand function p(q) : R+ → R+ is strictly decreasing and continuous in q =
P
i∈N qi;
and ( eA3) p (0) > c and limq→∞ p (q) = 0. Note that the latter two assumptions imply that, for all
levels of total output q, the price p is strictly positive. They also imply that there exists qc > 0
such that p (qc) < c. This says that firms can always force the price p at which firm i sells qi down
to a level strictly below c. In this case there is no floor for firms’ losses since the quantity sold —
and related costs — can tend to infinity when p approaches 0. The latter three assumptions are
encompassed by (A1-A3). Note in particular that our assumptions also capture circumstances in
which the price pi is driven down to exactly zero with finite quantities (qi,q−i), a case ruled out
by Abreu’s assumptions ( eA1- eA3).5
As in Abreu (1986) we construct a “stick-and-carrot” penal code. All firms initially collude
by choosing the collusive action am. If this action is played by all firms in all periods, each firm
earns the discounted sum of the single-period (positive) collusive profits πm ≡ π (am). All firms
have a short-run incentive to deviate, that is to lower (increase) its own price (quantity) in order
to increase individual profits at every other firm’s expense. If such a deviation is detected in
period t, all firms switch to the punishment action aP , in period t + 1 (the stick). The choice
5 In Abreu (1986, Assumption (A4), p. 195) each firm’s strategy set is defined on a finite interval of quantities
Si = [0, q¯ (δ)], where q¯ (δ) satisfies πi (q¯ (δ) , 0) < − δ1−δ supqi πi (qi, 0), in our notation. This means that q¯ (δ) is
specified to be greater than the quantity a firm should sell to incur a loss equal in magnitude to the continuation
profits, computed from the next period onward, it would earn as a monopolist in all periods forever. This upper
bound in fact is so high as to be always greater than the single-period punishment quantity that sustains optimal
collusion (see proof of Lemma 8, p. 201).
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of a low (high) punishment price (quantity) aP renders a free-riding behavior less attractive. If
any deviation from aP is detected, the punishment phase restarts, otherwise all firms resume the
collusive behavior by adopting the same am forever (the carrot).
In order to express results and related proofs with notational parsimony, independently of
the price and quantity specifications, hereafter we adopt the definition that the action a0 is more
severe to firm i than (strictly less severe than) a when π(a0) ≤ (>)π(a). This is denoted by
a0 ¹i (Âi)a, where the subscript is omitted whenever no ambiguity is likely to result.
A key feature of the paper is that we investigate the consequence of having a lower bound to
individual punishment actions, and thereby to punishment profits. We refer to this lower bound
aP ¹i aNE, for all i, as the most severe symmetric punishment action, a parameter. Given aP ,
we define π ≡ π (aP ) ≤ π (aNE). Most realistic circumstances offer a justification for this setting.
It can capture the impact of a regulatory measure. For example, a price floor will impose firms to
charge above a given value (say, a wholesale price), and then will limit the severity of punishment
actions (in some cases we may have π > 0). More generally, the severity of punishments is also
limited when the demanded quantity is finite at any price, including zero, for all firms.6 As
indicated above, there is no such constraining limit on punishments in Abreu (1986).7 However,
we may point to such a floor in more applied and recent contributions to the literature. When
the marginal cost is constant and set equal to zero, as in Häckner (1996) or Compte et al. (2002),
for examples, the lowest possible profits are zero. Another example is Vasconcelos (2005), where
there is a variable marginal cost and a finite demand, so that profits can be negative but limitedly
so. Our more general specification also captures these cases.
6 In two related papers, Yasuda (2009) and Beviá, Corchón, and Yasuda (2011) introduce a similar specification in
order to study how financial constraints affect collusion equilibrium payoffs and firms’ behavior in repeated games.
Yasuda (2009) shows in particular that, with a single-period punishment stick-and-carrot mechanism adapted from
Abreu (1986), collusion in which Cournot duopolists equally divide a monopoly profit in each period may not be
sustainable. Beviá, Corchón, and Yasuda (2011) also specify that profits must be greater than or equal to an
exogenously given value, which is non-positive. They characterize the allocations which can be sustained as an
equilibrium of a dynamic oligopoly model when no firm can be forced to bankruptcy by any other firm satisfying
the financial constraint. In both papers, a firm is assumed to go bankrupt if its profits are driven below the financial
threshold. This can be interpreted as a very severe form of punishment, as a binding financial constraint is assumed
to result in zero continuation profits. Our analysis is thus complementary, since in the present paper a binding
limited liability constraint does not imply bankruptcy. It only sets a limit to the severity of punishments, which
may be possibly associated to positive profits, as in the case of a profit target imposed by financial markets pressure.
7 In contrast, in the present model, the most severe punishment π can be arbitrarily close to the Nash payoff
π (aNE). In the final section on policy implications, the regulator can choose to adjust the profit floor above the
Nash payoff.
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We now introduce a few additional assumptions that are needed to produce formal results:
(A4) If a0−i ¹i (Âi)a−i then πi(ai,a0−i) ≤ (>)πi(ai,a−i), all ai ¹i am.
This assumption specifies the extension of the order relation to vector of actions. 8
Another specification of the model relates to deviation profits. A firm can earn positive
benefits by playing its best reply to all other firms’ action, only if the latter action is not too
severe. Formally:
(A5) There exists a˜P ¹i aNE such that πdi (a) ≤ (>)0 if and only if a ¹i (Âi)a˜P .
When all firms in N\{i} play a Âi a˜P , the latter assumption implies that firm i’s gross
deviation profits are strictly higher than the level of fixed costs, that is f . A consequence of (A5)
is that π (aNE) ≥ 0.
Although the analysis focuses on situations with limited punishments, the latter may be very
severe. A reference action that measures this severity is aˆP , which is such that the minmax profit
is obtained by stopping production. We assume that:
(A6) There exists aˆP ¹i a˜P such that πdi (a) = (>)− f if and only if a ¹i (Âi)aˆP .
In terms of output quantity, let qdi (a) denote firm i’s best-reply to a, as chosen by all other
firms. Assumption (A6) specifies that qdi (a) = 0 if a ¹i aˆP , and qdi (a) > 0 otherwise. In words,
any action a, as chosen by all firms in N\{i}, that is strictly more severe than aˆP , drives firm
i’s profit-maximizing output to zero. In particular, if aˆP ºi aP , then the most severe symmetric
punishment action, when played by all firms in N\{i}, is sufficiently penalizing as to incentivize
firm i to stop producing, and thereby to incur losses equal to the magnitude of fixed costs, its
minmax value. Note that π(a) > π if aˆP ºi a Âi aP , although qdi (a) = qdi (aP ) = 0, with firm i’s
best-reply profits πdi (a) = π
d
i (aP ) = −f ≤ 0. To gain familiarity with the notation, observe that
when firms’ strategic variable is price, and c = f = π = 0, as commonly assumed for simplicity
in many existing models, we have a˜P = aˆP = aP = 0, a particular case.
8 In the Bertrand (resp. Cournot) specification, firm i’s profits are often non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing)
with other firms’ symmetric price (resp. quantity), so that if p0−i ≤ p−i (or q0−i ≥ q−i) then p0−i ¹i p−i (and
q0−i ¹i q−i). This, however, does not hold in all cases. For example, in a simple price-setting oligopoly model with
perfect substitutes and constant marginal costs, if pi < pNE we have p0−i Âi p−i for all p0−i < p−i.
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When no constraint on the severity of a is introduced, as in most contributions to the literature,
profits π (a) are unbounded from below. In that case, since best-reply profits πdi (a) do have a
lower bound (a firm may always stop selling; see (A6)), we have πdi (a) − π (a) unbounded from
above. Recalling that πdi (aNE) − π (aNE) = 0, we know there exists at least one aˇ ¹i aNE
verifying πdi (aˇ)− π (aˇ) = πdi (am)− πm > 0. Finally we specify uniqueness, for simplicity:
(A7) There exists a unique aˇ ≺i am such that πdi (aˇ)− π (aˇ) = πdi (am)− πm.
Clearly aˇ ≺i aNE (since aˇ ¹i aNE by definition and πdi (aNE)−π (aNE) = 0 < πdi (am)−πm).
Note that (A7) is very mild. It captures in particular all usual situations in which the incentive
to deviate πdi (a)− π(a) increases with the severity of actions a ¹i aNE, and also with the level of
collusion a Âi aNE .9
In what follows we investigate the role of the parameter aP , that is the most severe punishment
action, on the implementation of collusion. This is done by first considering situations in which
the duration of punishments is limited to a single period.
3 The Benchmark
In this section, as a benchmark, we restrict the duration of the punishment phase to a single period.
For each player to have no incentive to deviate, a deviation must be followed by a punishment that
leads the discounted flow of profits to be less than the actualized stream of collusive equilibrium
profits. Moreover, for the punishment to be a credible threat, one should verify that firms do
implement the punishment action. This occurs if individual gains to deviate from the punishment
phase are smaller than the loss incurred by prolonging the punishment.10 Formally, the profile
{am, aP}, with aP ¹ am (this is for all i, so we can drop the subscript for the order relation),
must satisfy two incentive constraints, we refer to hereafter as IC0 and IC1, that is
πdi (am)− πm ≤ δ [πm − π(aP )] , (IC0 )
πdi (aP )− π(aP ) ≤ δ [πm − π(aP )] , (IC1)
9For an illustration with quantity-setting firms see Fig. 2 in Abreu (1986). In the present paper Fig. A-1 (in
the appendix) is made very intuitive when a is interpreted as a price.
10 In a trigger penal code à la Friedman (1971), a deviation implies that firms stop colluding and revert to the
one-shot stage game Nash equilibrium forever. The punishment action is then self-enforcing. A stick-and-carrot
setup authorizes a more severe (and also shorter) punishment phase that may lead firms to earn negative profits
for some time. It is not self-enforcing unless (IC1) holds.
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where π(a) denotes a firm’s stage profit when all competitors choose the same action a, and πdi (a)
is firm i’s profit from a one-shot best deviation from the action a selected by all rivals in N\{i}.
The first condition says that the profits associated with a deviation from the collusive action must
be smaller than what is lost due to the punishment phase. The second condition says that the
benefits associated with a deviation from the punishment must be smaller than the loss incurred
by prolonging the punishment by one more period.
Our objective is to delineate the largest space of parameters for which the two constraints are
satisfied. The problem we investigate is thus to find a punishment aP that minimizes δ under
the two incentive constraints (IC0-IC1). The solution a∗P , defined as the optimal punishment,
yields δ∗, the minimum. Before introducing additional constraints, we characterize a∗P and δ
∗ by
presenting three intermediate results.
Lemma 1. The optimal single-period punishment action a∗P and the discount factor lower bound
δ∗ are such that (IC0) and (IC1) hold with equality.
This first result establishes that, when aP = a∗P , and δ = δ
∗, the two incentive constraints are
exactly satisfied. Therefore we may compute a∗P and δ
∗ by solving in (aP , δ) the system (IC0-IC1)
with equality signs.
To compare, recall that Abreu (1986)’s problem consists in identifying the pair of actions
(aP , aC) that permits firms to maintain the most profitable collusive action aC for a given discount
factor δ. The two approaches are dual since the value δ∗ we obtain as a solution, for a given am,
is identical to the given value of δ that leads to the solution a∗C = am in Abreu’s problem. In the
latter, the solution a∗C is bounded from above by the stage-game joint-profit maximizing action.
When δ is high enough for this boundary value to be implemented as a collusive equilibrium, the
constraint not to deviate from collusion is slack. This explains why Lemma 1 differs slightly from
Abreu’s Theorem 15, in which the analogue of (IC0) holds with a weak inequality only (while
the analogue to (IC1) holds with an equality sign, as in the present case).
Note however that the single-period punishment action that implements the collusive action
needs not be a∗P . This is because a
∗
P is defined as the punishment action that satisfies (IC0-
IC1) for the lowest possible value of δ, that is exactly δ∗. When δ > δ∗, the collusive action is
implementable with a “non-optimal punishment” aP about a∗P .
We now introduce two additional constraints. The first one is a participation constraint.11 It
specifies that each firm, when it actualizes the future stream of profits earned from the period of
11Lambson (1987) refers to it as an individual rationality constraint.
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punishment onward, must be incentivized to continue playing the game even if it earned negative
profits for a while. Formally, it must be the case that π(aP ) +
P∞
k=1 δ
kπm ≥ 0. A simple
reorganization of terms, toward a more intuitive expression, leads to
(1− δ) [πm − π(aP )] ≤ πm. (PC )
In words, the participation constraint is satisfied when the profit a firm forgoes in the pun-
ishment period, that is the difference πm − π(aP ), is not greater than the discounted stream of
collusive profits earned in all following periods, that is πm/ (1− δ).
Note that (IC1), which we may rewrite as (1− δ) [πm − π(aP )] ≤ πm − πdi (aP ), can be easily
compared to (PC ). Recalling from (A5) that πdi (aP ) ≤ (>)0 if and only if aP ¹ (Â)a˜P , observe
that (IC1) is (weakly) stronger than (PC ) if and only if aP º a˜P . It follows that, when a∗P ≺ a˜P ,
(PC ) is violated, hence δ∗ is not attainable.
In this case, toward a solution to the participation-constrained problem we define a particular
punishment action, denoted by aP , that satisfies exactly both (IC0) and (PC ). In formal terms,
π (aP ) = πm − πdi (am).12 For notational clarity, let π ≡ π (aP ). Note that aP ≺ aNE because
π (aP ) < 0.
The next constraint is central to the analysis. It imposes a limit to the severity of the
punishments all firms may inflict on each other in a single period. Formally, aP must satisfy
π(aP ) ≥ π. (LLC )
This constraint can be rooted in structural conditions (e.g., demand is finite at any price, including
zero), financial considerations (e.g., a profitability target), or in institutional features (e.g., a
regulation). In what follows we refer to this weak inequality as the limited liability constraint. It
does not appear in Abreu (1986)’s seminal paper, where the inverse demand is strictly monotonic,
and the constant marginal cost is always positive, so that losses can be made as negative as needed
by charging sufficiently close to zero. In the majority of more recent models which capitalize
on Abreu’s results, and specify a stick-and-carrot mechanism with a single punishment period, a
limited liability constraint is implicit (e.g., the quantity demanded is finite for all prices, including
zero), although to the best of our knowledge its implications were not investigated in the literature.
12The implicit definition of aP is obtained by rewriting (IC1) as δ ≥

πdi (am)− πm

/ [πm − π (aP )], and (PC)
as δ ≥ −π (aP ) / [πm − π (aP )]. Then observe that the denominators are equal. If a∗P ≺ a˜P , we know that
aP exists. This is because πdi (am) − πm = πdi (a∗P ) − π (a∗P ) from Lemma 1, and πdi (a∗P ) < 0 from (A5), hence
π (a∗P ) < πm−πdi (am) < 0. Recalling that π (aNE) ≥ 0, by the intermediate value theorem we have a∗P ≺ aP ≺ aNE
such that π (aP ) = πm − πdi (am).
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Note from (IC0) that the first incentive constraint is satisfied if and only if
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/δ ≤
πm− π(aP ), and from (LLC ) that the limited liability constraint can be rewritten πm− π(aP ) ≤
πm − π. It follows that, for a given collusive “target” am to be implementable, we must have£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/δ ≤ πm − π for some δ ∈ (0, 1]. The latter condition obviously does not hold if
limδ→1
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/δ > πm − π, or equivalently if π > πm −
¡
πdi (am)− πm
¢
. Accordingly,
the limited liability constraint can be so strong as to make collusion impossible. Because we
assume that π < π (aNE), a feasibility condition for am to be implementable in this single-period
punishment context is πm − π (aNE) ≥ πdi (am) − πm. In words, the one-shot profit of collusion
must be greater than the gain to deviating from it.
The order relation on the set of punishment actions aP , as defined in the previous section,
implies that (LLC ) can be rewritten as aP º aP . This does not mean that punishments cannot
result in very low profits when (LLC ) is satisfied. Indeed recall from (A5) that the “lower” bound
aP , when played by all firms in N\{i}, can be sufficiently severe as to make firm i stop producing
as a best-reply.
We may now write the δ-minimization problem in aP as follows:
min
aP∈A
δ
s.t. IC0; IC1;PC ;LLC
(1)
The lowest δ for which the collusive action am is implementable finds different expressions
depending on the comparison of the structurally defined punishment actions a∗P , aP , and aP .
Proposition 1. The collusive action am ¹ a∗m is implementable with a single-period punishment
if and only if δ ≥ δ∗1, with
δ∗1 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
δ∗ ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πm−π(a∗P )
if a∗P º aP , aP (regime 1);
δ ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πm−π if aP º aP , a∗P (regime 2);
δ ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πm−π if aP º a∗P , aP (regime 3);
(2)
with δ∗ < 1 and δ < 1 for all parameter values, and δ < (=) 1 if and only if π < (=)πm −¡
πdi (am)− πm
¢
.
The three regimes identified in Proposition 1 reflect which constraints are at play in the δ-
minimization problem (1). In regime 1, the two incentive constraints are stronger than (PC ) and
(LLC ). The optimal punishment is a∗P , and the minimized discount factor is δ
∗
1 = δ
∗ (here the
subscript “1” refers to the single-period punishment case). In regime 2, (IC0) and (PC ) bite,
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the optimal punishment is aP , and am can be implemented only if δ ≥ δ∗1 = δ; while in regime 3,
(IC0) and (LLC ) are binding, the optimal punishment is aP , and am can be implemented only
if δ ≥ δ∗1 = δ. Note that (IC0) is active in all regimes. In fact a firm’s incentive to deviate from
the collusive action remains the same in the three regimes.
Another important point is that the comparison between regimes 1 and 2 differs in kind from
the comparison between regime 3 and either regime 1 or 2. More precisely, whether a solution is
of the regime-1 or regime-2 type depends on whether (PC ) is stronger than (IC1) or not. Their
ranking is rooted in the firms’ payoff functions. Whether regime 3 arises or not can also depend
on the strategy set, which can be limited “from below” for all sorts of institutional or financial
reasons that do not relate to cost or demand conditions.
Remark 1. If a∗P º aP , aP , so that regime 1 applies, δ∗ ≥ δ, δ.
This remark emphasizes a subtle aspect of Proposition 1. Obviously, when either regime 2
or 3 applies, so that either (PC ) or (LLC ) binds, respectively, we have δ∗ ≤ δ, δ. Indeed the
δ-minimization problem (1) is more constrained than when only the incentive constraints (IC0)
and (IC1) are considered. However, when regime 1 applies, it does not mean that (PC ) and
(LLC ) are set aside. It only means that (IC0) and (IC1) are stronger than both (PC ) and
(LLC ). Hence the relevant threshold δ∗ cannot be lower than δ and δ. More generally, in the
single-period punishment benchmark problem, at most two constraints bind, that determine the
threshold for δ. This threshold can only be higher than the other two expressions in (2).
A final observation is that, while δ∗ and δ are both lower than 1, the limited liability constraint
can be so strong as to result in δ > 1, in which case the collusive action am is not implementable
with a single-period scheme, for any δ. Recalling that our objective is to identify the largest space
of parameters for which a given collusive action is implementable, it remains to investigate the
possibility to lengthen the duration of the punishment phase. The intuition is that, by shifting
to a multi-period punishment scheme, firms can penalize more severely a deviation than in the
single-period framework. This can soften the lower bound condition on the discount factor, and
thus facilitate collusion.13 However, we demonstrate in the next section that this occurs only is
very specific circumstances, we fully characterize.
13Several periods of punishment have been considered only in a few theoretical contributions with more specific
assumptions than in the present model. Lambson (1987) considers price-setting sellers of a homogenous good,
a constant average cost, with capacity constraints. Häckner (1996) constructs a repeated price-setting duopoly
model, with spatial differentiation, and a constant average cost normalized to zero. In Lambertini and Sasaki
(2002), again there are two firms and a constant marginal average cost, but with another specification of the
horizontal differentiation assumption, together with a non-negative constraint on quantities, but not on prices.
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4 The Main Results
In this section we introduce the possibility for firms to choose a punishment action over several
periods. The objective is to investigate the impact of the extended length of punishment on firms’
ability to implement collusion, when the severity of punishment is limited in each period.
To do that, consider a stick-and-carrot penal code in which, if any deviation from am by
any firm is detected, all firms switch to a l-period punishment phase (the stick) during which
they play aP,k, with k = 1, . . . , l. Punishment actions may vary from one period to another. A
deviation from the punishment action may occur in any period of punishment. If this occurs, the
punishment phase restarts for l more periods, after which all firms revert to the initial collusive
action am forever (the carrot).
Formally, the two incentive constraints (IC0) and (IC1) are now extended to
πdi (am) +
lX
k=1
δkπ(aP,k) +
∞X
k=l+1
δkπm ≤
∞X
k=0
δkπm, (3)
and
πdi (aP,s) +
lX
k=1
δkπ (aP,k) +
∞X
k=l+1
δkπm ≤
lX
k=s
δk−sπ(aP,k) +
∞X
k=l+1
δk−sπm, (4)
respectively, for any period s in which a firm deviates from the penal code, with 1 ≤ s ≤ l, all i.
Given am, the vector aP ≡ (aP,1, . . . , aP,k, . . . , aP,l) sustains collusion if and only if (3) and
(4) are satisfied. There are 1+ l incentive constraints in all: the single constraint in (3) says that
the gain earned by deviating from the collusive action must be smaller than what is lost over
the l periods of punishment; the other l constraints in (4) say that the gain to deviate from the
punishment phase, in any period s, with 1 ≤ s ≤ l, must be smaller than the loss incurred by
re-initiating the punishment phase.
To simplify the presentation of incentive constraints and clarify their interpretation, we now
introduce a value function. If a firm does not deviate from the punishment path, the continuation
profits it earns from period s+ 1 onward is
Vs (aP , δ) =
lX
k=s+1
δk−s−1π(aP,k) +
∞X
k=l+1
δk−s−1πm. (5)
Here s = 0 indicates that the l-period flow of punishment profits is not truncated from below,
whereas s = l means that exactly all punishment profits are removed, so that only collusive profits
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are considered from period l + 1 onward. Note from (5) that aP,l+1 = am implies Vs (aP , δ) ≤
Vl (aP , δ) = πm/ (1− δ), all s. This also implies that Vl (aP , δ) = V0 (am, δ).
Then the multi-period incentive constraints in (3) and (4) are
πdi (am)− πm ≤ δ [V0 (am, δ)− V0 (aP , δ)] , (MIC 0)
and
πdi (aP,1)− π (aP,1) ≤ δ [V1 (aP , δ)− V0 (aP , δ)] , (MIC 1)
. . . (...)
πdi (aP,s)− π(aP,s) ≤ δ [Vs (aP , δ)− V0 (aP , δ)] , (MIC s)
. . . (...)
πdi (aP,l)− π(aP,l) ≤ δ [Vl (aP , δ)− V0 (aP , δ)] , (MIC l)
respectively, with 1 ≤ s ≤ l. Note that π(aP,s) ≤ πdi (aP,s) requires that V0 (aP , δ) ≤ Vs (aP , δ),
all s, a feasibility condition of the punishment scheme.
In (MIC 0) we compare a firm’s payoff when it colludes by choosing am, that is πm+δV0 (am, δ),
with the payoff it earns by deviating, that is πdi (am) + δV0 (aP , δ). It is individually rational to
stick to the collusive action if this first constraint is satisfied. The next incentive constraints,
one for each period of punishment, compare a firm’s payoff when it implements a punishment
action, with the payoff it earns by deviating. More precisely, in (MIC 1) we compare the firm’s
payoff when it plays aP,1, that is π (aP,1) + δV1 (aP , δ), with the payoffs it earns by deviating,
that is πdi (aP,1)+ δV0 (aP , δ). The next row describes the same comparison for the next period of
punishment, and so on, down to (MIC l). A firm will not deviate from the l-period punishment
path if all constraints of rank s = 1, . . . , l are satisfied.
A first technical claim is a multi-period counterpart to Lemma 1, as offered above in the
single-period punishment case.
Lemma 2. Given aP,1, the lowest discount factor δ verifying (MIC 0) and (MIC 1) results from
punishment actions aP,k, with k > 1, such that these two multi-period incentive constraints bind.
The multi-period participation constraint is Vs (aP , δ) ≥ 0, all s = 0, 1, . . . , l. In words, the
continuation profits, from the first period of punishment onward, must remain non-negative for a
firm to implement the punishment aP . Interestingly this can also be rewritten as
(1− δ) [V0 (am, δ)− Vs (aP , δ)] ≤ πm, (MPC )
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all s = 0, 1, . . . , l, an intuitive generalization of the single-punishment period counterpart in
(PC ). This says that the sum of profits that each firm foregoes by implementing the remaining
punishment as+1, . . . , al, that is the difference V0 (am, δ) − Vs (aP , δ), cannot be more than the
discounted stream of profits earned in all collusive periods that follow, πm/ (1− δ).14
Observe from (MIC 0) and (MPC ) that the value differential V0 (am, δ)−V0 (aP , δ) is bounded
from below by
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/δ and from above by πm/ (1− δ), respectively. This yields:
Lemma 3. The lowest δ compatible with (MIC 0) and (MPC ) is δ ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πdi (am)
.
Therefore there can be no l-period punishment aP that implements am when the discount
factor is strictly lower than δ. In other words, the lengthening of the punishment scheme cannot
help relaxing the participation constraint.
Now the multi-period limited liability constraint is
π(aP,k) ≥ π, (MLLC )
with 1 ≤ k ≤ l, all l ≥ 2. In words, the limited liability constraint (MLLC ) captures structural
conditions imposing that, in any period k of the punishment phase, a firm’s profit cannot be
driven below π, a parameter. Note that (MLLC ) implies that aP,1 º aP , which we use to prove
(in Appendix) the following technical result:
Lemma 4. The lowest δ compatible with (MIC 0) and (MLLC ) is δ0 ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πdi (am)−πdi (aP )
.
Given all constraints, the multi-period punishment problem is
min
(aP,1,...,aP,l)∈Al
δ
s.t. (MIC 0−MIC l);MPC ;MLLC
(7)
For any given l, the optimal multi-period punishment is the solution in aP = (aP,1, . . . , aP,l) to
(7). It yields the lowest possible value of the discount factor, we denote by δ∗l , that authorizes
firms to implement am, under all constraints. In what follows we examine successively the role of
the 1 + l multi-period incentive constraints (MIC 0-MIC l), the participation constraint (MPC ),
and the limited liability constraint (MLLC ).
14The latter interpretation of (MPC ) is even more intuitive when one sees that V0 (aM , δ) − V0 (aP , δ) =Sl
k=1 δ
k−1 (π(aM )− π(aP,k)), so that l = 1 leads to (PC ), the participation constraint in the single-period punish-
ment setup.
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We now establish that, in the absence of participation and limited liability constraints, or
when they are slack, the possibility to punish over several periods does not result in an optimal
punishment path that differs from the single-period punishment case, our benchmark.
Proposition 2. In the multi-period punishment scheme, if a∗P º aP , aP the collusive action
am ¹ a∗m is implementable if and only if δ ≥ δ∗, and a∗P ≡ (a∗P , am, . . . , am) is optimal.
Obviously it is always possible to replicate the single-period punishment scheme by playing
aP,1 = aP in the first period, followed in all l−1 subsequent periods by the same collusive action,
that is aP,k = am, all k = 2, . . . , l. Proposition 2 establishes that, when (MPC ) and (MLLC ) are
slack, by doing so with aP = a∗P one obtains the lowest possible value of δ for which the collusive
action am is implementable. The threshold value of the discount factor we obtain in this l-period
punishment scheme is the same as in the single-punishment case, namely δ∗.
Remark 2. If a∗P º aP , aP there is a unique punishment path a∗P that permits firms to implement
am for δ = δ∗.
In other words, as long as the participation and limited liability constraints are not binding,
there is one best way to solve (7). In a supergame with discounting, late punishments have less
impact. Firms must charge a low price or supply a large quantity as early as possible, that is in the
first punishment period, in order to minimize the discount factor at which am is implementable.
Next, we establish that, when the multi-period participation constraint binds, again the pos-
sibility to punish over several periods does not enlarge the space of parameters for which the
collusive action is implementable.
Proposition 3. In the multi-period punishment scheme, if aP º aP , a∗P , the collusive action
am ¹ a∗m is implementable if and only if δ ≥ δ, and aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am) is optimal.
When (MPC ) binds, by playing aP in the first punishment period (as in the single-period
scheme), followed by the same collusive action afterwards (i.e., aP,k = am, all k = 2, . . . , l), one
obtains the lowest possible value of δ for which am is implementable. This discount threshold is the
same as in the single-punishment case when (PC ) binds, that is δ. The intuition for this result is
straightforward. Indeed the participation constraint V0 (aP , δ) ≥ 0 determines the maximum total
punishment a firm can incur (as opposed to a per-period punishment). In fact this constraint
is identical in the single- and multi-period schemes, since the definition of the maximum total
punishment does not depend on the number of periods. When the participation constraint binds
with only one punishment period, it cannot be relaxed by extending the number of periods.
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Remark 3. If aP Â a∗P there is a continuum of punishments that permit firms to implement am
for δ = δ.
This says that, when (MPC ) binds, the punishment aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am) is only one way,
among others, of implementing am when the discount factor is the lowest possible, at δ. Firms
may opt for a softer first-period action if they choose to lengthen the punishment phase to one or
several subsequent periods, before reverting to am. While the possibility to punish over several
periods does not permit firms to reduce the discount factor threshold for which the collusive action
is implementable, the space of punishment strategies that allow them to reach a given threshold
is strictly larger than in the single-period punishment case.
We now turn to the case of a binding limited liability constraint. We will see that it differs
qualitatively from the previous cases, in that additional punishment periods result in a strictly
lower discount threshold than with a single-period scheme.
The next proposition describes the optimal punishment, and characterizes the associated
discount threshold, when (MLLC ) binds.
Proposition 4. In the multi-period punishment scheme, if aP º a∗P , aP collusion at am ¹ a∗m is
implementable if and only if δ ≥ δM ≡ sup{δ, δ0}, with aP ≡ (aP , aP,2, . . . , aP,l) of finite length l.
Remark 4. If (MLLC ) is strictly binding, that is if aP Â a∗P , aP , there exits a continuum of
optimal punishments (aP , a2, . . . , al) of finite length l ≥ 2, such that am is implementable for
δ = δM .
In other words, when the limited liability constraint binds, so that the single period punish-
ment action aP,1 cannot be more severe than aP , the multi-period optimal punishment profile
does not necessarily look like the usual front-loading scheme (where firms are punished as much
as immediately possible before returning to the collusive path as soon as possible). In fact the
optimal profile (aP , a2, . . . , al) can display much more complicated patterns.
Example 1. Two price-setting firms sell a homogeneous good in a market with a linear demand.
Sales from firm i are given by
qi(p) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
q(pi) if pi < pj
1
2q(pi) if pi = pj
0 if pi > pj
,
where q(pi) = sup{0, α − pi} for α > 0 and pi ≥ 0, with i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. The unit cost of
production is a constant c > 0, the fixed cost is f > 0, and there is a price-floor regulation which
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prohibits below-marginal-cost pricing, i.e. pP = pNE = c, so that the limited liability constraint
is π(pP,k) ≥ π = −f , with 1 ≤ k ≤ l, all l ≥ 2. The punishment profile aP possibly can take the
form of a price asymmetric cycle, where fast price increases from c to the (perfect) collusive price
p∗m =
α+c
2 are followed by several smaller decreases down to the price floor, or the neighborhood
of it (see Figure 1).
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
kPp ,prices
== cp
P
periods
2/)( cpm += α
Figure 1: The punishment profile pP≡ (pP , pP,2, . . . , pP,l) in Example 1 can take the form of asymmetric
price cycles (here with α = 1, c = 1/4, pP= pNE= c = 1/4, implying that δM≡ sup {δ0,δ} = 1/2). In this
ten-period punishment phase, fast price increases from pP to p
∗
m= (α+ c)/2 are followed by a two-period fall
down to pP= c (here with intermediate prices aP,3= aP,6= aP,9= (pP+p
∗
m)/2).
Example 1 echoes recent empirical investigations on dynamic pricing behavior in retail gasoline
markets, where asymmetric retail price cycles are observed. They begin with a price jump, followed
by a series of smaller price cuts, until the observed price reaches the competitive level (Eckert
(2002), Eckert and West (2004); Noel (2006, 2007)). Then the cycle restarts, and so on. This
resembles the Edgeworth cycles obtained as a (non-collusive) equilibrium in an alternating-move
price-setting duopoly model by Maskin and Tirole (1988). In the present model, we see in Figure
1 that two-phase asymmetric cycles are also consistent with the implementation of a multi-period
punishment when firms are constrained not to charge below the marginal cost.15
15The limited liability constraint in Example 1 echoes the regulations that constrain the formation of gasoline
retail prices above the wholesale (rack) price in several U.S. states and Canadian provinces (Houde 2008, 2010). In
our setup there can be no deviation from the collusive path in equilibrium. However, should uncertainty of some
kind be introduced, out-of-equilibrium punishment profiles would be observed (for example, unobserved random
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We may now state our main proposition. It synthesizes the previous results, and allows us to
rank all the discount thresholds introduced above.
Proposition 5. If aP Â a∗P , aP , and additional punishment periods are introduced, the lowest
discount factor δM that permits the implementation of am ¹ a∗m cannot be as low as δ∗, and can
attain δ only in particular circumstances. More formally, either aP ¹ a∗P so that δ∗ < δM < δ,
or aP Â a∗P and δ ≤ δM < δ. In the latter case δM = δ if and only if a˜P º aP Â aP Â a∗P .
In other words, when regime 3 applies in the single-period scheme, a delayed punishment with
discounting offers only an imperfect substitute for more immediate severity.
To see that, suppose that, absent the (multi-period) limited liability constraint (MLLC ),
regime 1 applies. Then recall from Remark 2 that the only punishment profile allowing firms
to implement collusion when δ = δ∗, a lower bound, is a∗P ≡ (a∗P , am, . . . , am). When limited
liability results in regime 3 to apply, we know that a∗P is unattainable in the first punishment
period. In that case a longer punishment phase permits firms to increase the total punishment,
and thereby facilitates collusion in that it results in a discount threshold δM which is lower than
δ. However, with discounting, delayed punishments harm less. They do not allow δM to attain
the lower bound δ∗.
As an alternative, suppose now that, absent the limited liability constraint, regime 2 applies.
In that case, recalling that aP is implicitly defined by π = πm − πdi (am), it is straightforward
to observe from the comparison of the expressions of δ and δ0, as displayed in Proposition 3 and
Lemma 4 respectively, that the two thresholds coincide if and only if πdi (aP ) = 0, or equivalently
aP = a˜P . When punishments cannot be very severe, in that aP Â a˜P , firms earn positive profits
by deviating from the punishment “floor” (i.e., πdi (aP ) > 0, see Assumption A6). In that case
there is no finite number of punishment periods that allow firms to implement am for a discount
level as low as δ. That is, δM > δ. Only when the most severe punishment is such that firms
cannot break even by deviating, so that their minmax profit is non-positive (i.e., πdi (aP ) ≤ 0),
they may implement am by lengthening the punishment phase for any discount level greater than
or equal to δ, that is δM = δ.
By substituting (aP , am, . . . , am) for aP in (MIC 1), and reorganizing terms, we obtain that
πdi (aP ) ≤ πm for all aP ¹ am. This leads to:
Remark 5. δM ≤ 1.
shocks on demand may induce price wars to appear in equilibrium, as first investigated in Porter (1983) and Green
and Porter (1984)).
23
In other words, the Folk theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)) is verified in the multi-
period punishment setup (recall from Proposition 1 that, with a single period of punishment, in
Regime 3 we have δ > 1 for π sufficiently high).
The next section illustrates the latter results and their interpretation in the usual context of
a linear case.
5 A Linear Case
In this section, we introduce additional specifications on costs and demand in order to illustrate the
importance of considering limited liability constraints in the familiar context of a linear oligopoly
structure. We investigate the circumstances which allow firms to sustain perfect collusion (i.e., to
maximize joint profits) when prices cannot be negative. Toward this aim, we assume that, over
all periods, demand is derived from a utility function adapted from Häckner (2000), of the form
U(q, I) =
nX
i=1
qi −
1
2
⎛
⎝
nX
i=1
q2i + 2γ
X
i6=j
qiqj
⎞
⎠+ I, (8)
which is quadratic in the consumption of q-products and linear in the consumption of the compos-
ite I-good (i.e., the numeraire).16 The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) measures product substitutability as
perceived by consumers. If γ → 0, the demand for the different product varieties are independent
and each firm has monopolistic market power, while if γ → 1, the products are perfect substitutes.
Consumers maximize utility subject to the budget constraint
P
piqi + I ≤ m, where m denotes
income, pi is the non-negative price of product i, and the price of the composite good I is normal-
ized to one. By symmetry, we note
P
j 6=i qj = (n− 1)qj . On the cost side, in the example we set
f = 0, for simplicity, and a constant marginal cost c < 1. We examine the Cournot version of the
model. With quantity-setting firms, the relation q0 is more severe than q is formally equivalent
to q0 ≥ q.
From (8) firm i’s inverse demand function in each period is
pi(qi, qj) = sup{0, 1− qi − γ(n− 1)qj}, (9)
and the inverse demand for each other symmetric firm j in N\{i} is
pj(qi, qj) = sup {0, 1− γqi − (1 + γ(n− 2))qj} , (10)
16 In Häckner (2000), quantities qi are multiplied by a parameter ai, that is a measure of the distinctive quality
of each variety i. Here we exclude vertical product differentiation by assuming that ai = 1, all i ∈ N .
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all qi, qj ≥ 0, i 6= j. It is straightforward to check that a firm’s profit function is continuous and
the associated maximization problem is convex.
Which of the three regimes we identified in Proposition 1 applies depends on the status of
the participation and limited liability constraints. This in turn depends on the number of firms
n, the degree of product differentiation γ, and the marginal (and unit) cost c. The connection of
the latter cost parameter to the limited liability constraint, is very intuitive in this example.
With a linear demand, the quantity demanded is finite at all prices. The limited liability
constraint here does not artificially set boundaries to firms’ strategies, as it only formalizes that
prices cannot be negative:
π(aP,k) ≥ π ≡ π
³
qP
´
,
where the most severe punishment qP is obtained when the price charged by all firms is equal
to zero. This may result in exactly zero profits if the marginal cost is equal to zero as well, or
to losses if the price-cost margin is negative, all other things (i.e., the demand to each firm)
remaining equal. Whether the endogenous q∗P or qP , as defined above (by simply substituting q
for a) is less or more severe than qP can thus be seen to depend only on the comparison of c with
a threshold level, we denote by c, which is a function of n and γ.
In the specific algebraic context of this example, we check that (PC ) binds if and only if
qP ≥ q˜P , where q˜P = (1− c) / [γ (n− 1)] is computed by solving πd(q) = 0 (see Assumption
(A5)). Note that, in the absence of fixed costs, we have q˜P = qˆP (see Assumption (A6)). Observe
that, because of the absence of fixed costs, deviation profits here cannot be negative (a firm
may stop producing to earn zero benefit). Moreover (LLC ) binds if and only if qP ≥ qP , where
qP = 1/ [1 + γ(n− 1)] is obtained by solving pi(q, q) = 0. This is because, in the absence of
regulatory intervention, the lower bound to punishment profits results from the non-negativity
constraint in prices (it binds when quantities are sufficiently large, because demand is finite).
In the appendix, we compute the expression of the frontier c˜, a function of n and γ, which
delineates the parameter space in which the quantity q∗m (perfect collusion) can be implemented
in the benchmark set-up with a single-period punishment scheme.17 If c < c˜, collusion cannot
be sustained, for any set of parameter values, with a single-period punishment scheme. How-
ever, we verify in Appendix 8.3.1 that collusion at q∗m can always be implemented with a multi-
period punishment scheme for some δ in [δM , 1], which illustrates the Folk theorem in this lin-
17With a multi-period punishment scheme, the collusive quantity q∗m is always implementable by mimicking a
trigger mechanism (with qP = qNE , the Cournot equilibrium quantity, forever). In that case collusion is sustainable
for all δ ≥ π
d
i (q
∗
m)−π
∗
m
πdi (q
∗
m)−π(qNE)
. The latter discount threshold is less than 1 for all π∗m > π (qNE).
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ear setup. We also compute the three-part expression of a continuous frontier c, with c = 0 if
0 ≤ γ ≤ γˆ, c = c0 > 0 if γˆ < γ ≤ γˇ, and c = c00 > c0 otherwise, with γˆ ≡ 2/ (n− 1) and
γˇ ≡ 2
¡
1 +
√
2
¢
/ (n− 1), all n. They lead to a partition of the parameter space (n, γ, c) into three
subsets, one for each regime.
1=c
0 1=γ
PP
qqc =′′ :
regime 2:
∗≤ PPP qqq ,regime 1:
PPP
qqq ,≤∗
γγ ˆ=
PP
qqc =′ ∗:
PP
qq =~
γγ (=
PP qq =∗
c~
PPP
qqq ,∗≤
regime 3:
Figure 2: Collusion regimes in plane (c, γ) for n ≥ 6. The limited liability constraint binds in the grey area
(regime 3). In the benchmark single-period set-up, the collusive quantity is not implementable below the frontier c˜.
Proposition 6. The parameter space (c, n, γ) is partitioned in three subsets where either Regime
1, 2, or 3, as defined in (2), applies.
The partition (which is extensively described and commented in Appendix 8.3.3) is such that,
if the constant unit cost is sufficiently high (formally, c ≥ c), either regime 1, where neither (PC )
nor (LLC ) binds, or regime 2, where (PC ) binds, applies. The former case may hold for all n ≥ 2,
while the second cannot arise if n < 6. Regime 3 is ruled out only if n = 2. Otherwise, when goods
are sufficiently substitutable (γ ≥ γˆ), and for all numbers of firms, a sufficiently large reduction
in c will always result in a shift to regime 3, where (LLC ) binds. Fig. 2 precisely illustrates this
point.18 Note that the non-implementability frontier c˜ is monotone increasing in γ and crosses
the plane (γ, c) below c00. It is non-negative if and only if γ ≥ γˇ. Because inf {γˇ, 1} = 1 if and
18 In this figure, γ < (=)γˇ is equivalent to q∗P < (=)q˜P (see Appendix 8.3.2). Hence it is also equivalent to
q∗P < (=)qP , from Lemma 4.
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only if n < 6, the collusive q∗m cannot be implemented in the single-period scheme for all n ≥ 6 if
the products are sufficiently substitutable or the marginal cost is sufficiently low.19
Another interesting aspect of Proposition 6 is that the limited liability constraint can be
ignored for all values of c and γ if there are exactly two or three firms (see Regime 1-(i)). In that
case, the results obtained in the literature on the implementation of collusion with a duopoly,
homogenous goods, and a cost set to zero, are robust. This does not apply when n > 3.
It is also of interest to compare Proposition 6 with Abreu (1986), where there is no limited
liability constraint. In that paper, the model is a Cournot oligopoly with a strictly positive
constant unit cost, homogenous goods, and a quantity demanded that tends to infinity when the
price approaches zero. Then the collusive q∗m can be implemented with a one-period punishment
penal code, for all numbers of firms, provided that the discount factor δ is above a threshold δ∗.
If there are at most three firms, Proposition 6 extends Abreu’s result to our specific example for
any (c, γ). This is remarkable since our demand specification is not a special case of Abreu’s class
of demand functions. However, with more than three firms, the values of c and/or γ must be
higher than a threshold for a single-period punishment scheme to implement collusion at δ = δ∗
or δ = δ.20
The role of costs, given n and γ, can be illustrated by comparing q∗P and qP with qP for any
c defined on [0, 1]. The punishment quantities are represented for all n ≥ 6 again, with highly
substitutable products in Fig. 3(a), where γˇ < γ, and for more differentiated products in Fig.
3(b), where γ < γˆ. In both cases regime 3 applies when the constant cost parameter is low, that
is c ≤ c. For higher levels of c we have regime 2 in (a), and regime 1 in (b). Note that the cost
threshold c is monotone increasing in n and γ (see (26-28) in Appendix 8.3.2).
As for the structural boundary level qP , it depends only on the number of competitors and
demand parameters. It is monotone decreasing when either n or γ increases, but constant in c.
The optimal punishment quantities q∗P and qP are linear in the cost parameter and monotone
decreasing when it rises closer to 1.
19 In the Appendix 8.3.1 we show that the feasibility condition in Assumption (A8) is always satisfied. It would
not be the case if a sufficiently high floor on pi or low capacity constraint on qi were added to the specifications.
Then q∗m could not be implemented for any admissible δ even in the multi-period set-up.
20This result contrasts even more sharply with trigger penal code models, in which one can easily check that the
sustainability of collusion is not directly connected to the level of marginal costs (at least in the linear cost setup).
27
)(a
1=c
Pq
PP qq ˆ~ = Pq
P
q
0 cc ′′=
regime 3 regime 2
mq
1=c
Pq
mq
Pq*
P
q
0 cc ′=
regime 3 regime 1 )(b
PP qq ˆ~ =
Figure 3: Thick lines represent optimal punishment quantities (all c, and n ≥ 6). In (a) products are highly
substitutable (γˇ < γ). Regime 3 applies for c ≤ c00, and regime 2 applies otherwise. In (b) products are more
differentiated (γ < γˇ). Regime 3 applies for c ≤ c0, and regime 1 applies otherwise.
We can also characterize the effect of a change in the marginal cost c, the differentiation
parameter γ, or the number of firms n, on the discount factor thresholds δ∗, δ, δ, and δM . To
summarize:
Proposition 7. High marginal costs facilitate collusion in that the limited liability constraint
plays no role only if c ≥ c, where c is monotone increasing in n,γ. Moreover: (i) δ∗ and δ are
monotone increasing in n and γ, and are independent of c; (ii) δ and δM are monotone increasing
in n and γ, and monotone decreasing in c.
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This proposition establishes that an increase in product differentiation, and a reduction in the
number of firms, facilitate collusion in two ways. Given δ, it enlarges the range of cost parameters
for which optimal collusion can be implemented. Given c, more differentiation and less firms both
lower the discount factor thresholds associated to the three different regimes.
6 Connections to the Literature
In this section, we discuss the robustness of theoretical results, as received from a selection of
related papers, to the introduction of a limited liability constraint.
One stream of the theoretical literature on collusion has followed Friedman (1971) by con-
sidering trigger strategies (commonly referred to as “grim” strategies), which call for reversion
to the one-shot stage game Nash equilibrium forever when a deviation from the collusive rule
is detected in a previous period. When firms cannot observe their competitors’ output levels,
unobserved random shocks in demand can induce price wars to appear in equilibrium (see Porter
(1983), Green and Porter (1984)). When all parameters and individual strategies are observable,
models with various specific functional forms indicate that, for any number of firms, tacitly col-
lusive agreements are more easily sustained with quantity-setting firms than with price-setting
oligopolists, and with highly differentiated products (Deneckere (1983, 1984), Majerus (1988),
Chang (1991), Ross (1992), Häckner (1994)).
A weakness common to all models of collusion with trigger strategies is that they rule out
the possibility of modulating the level of punishments. More precisely, by assuming that when a
deviation is detected firms revert to the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot stage game forever, they
arbitrarily put an upper bound on the severity of punishments. In this particular context where
the strategy set is de facto truncated, the limited liability constraint plays no role. Indeed, by
assumption (LLC ) cannot bind whenever aP ≺ aNE. Provided the strategy set is not arbitrarily
truncated, the limited liability constraint does impact firms’ ability to sustain collusion.
A series of papers that formalize a stick-and-carrot penal code, in the spirit of Abreu (1986,
1988), investigate the impact of product differentiation and industry concentration on the sus-
tainability of collusive agreements. An example is Wernerfelt (1989), who finds that more product
differentiation renders collusion less sustainable when the number of quantity-setting oligopolists
is relatively large.21 In a repeated Bertrand (i.e., price-setting) model with two firms, spatial hori-
21Although of interest, this ambiguous result is derived from demand assumptions (adapted from Deneckere,
1983) which are not standard (on this see Osterdal, 2003, pp. 54-55).
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zontal differentiation, and a constant marginal cost set equal to zero, Häckner (1996) demonstrates
that there exists an optimal symmetric stick-and-carrot punishment scheme, and establishes in-
stead that differentiation facilitates collusive agreements. It is also demonstrated that, when the
punishment price is constrained to be non-negative, a prolonged price war is an optimal collusive
strategy. However in this setup there cannot be below cost pricing, a restriction that does not fit
most real-world circumstances. Our paper extends the analysis to positive marginal costs, and
reveals they do impact firms’ ability to sustain collusion.
With two firms and constant marginal costs again, but with another specification of the
horizontal differentiation assumption, Lambertini and Sasaki (2002) find a qualitatively similar
relationship between product substitutability and collusion sustainability. This is obtained in a
setup where quantities are constrained to be non-negative although prices may fall below zero.
The example in the previous section extends this result to a linear setup with n firms, when
the limited liability constraint imposes prices to be non-negative. Lambertini and Sasaki also
find that, for all degrees of product differentiation, perfect collusion is less easily sustainable in
Bertrand than in Cournot. The intuition is that incentives to deviate in the Bertrand case are
higher than in the Cournot setup, because a deviating firm can capture the whole demand in a
price-setting oligopoly. This does not apply in a quantity-setting oligopoly, because a unilateral
expansion in some firm’s output cannot eliminate its rivals’ demand. When the limited liability
constraint is taken into account, in principle the ability to sustain collusion can only be further
limited. Although the severity of punishment does not depend on the nature of competition,
we show in section 5 that the limited liability constraint binds more often in Bertrand than in
Cournot.
Another strand of literature investigates the impact of cost asymmetries on collusion. Compte,
Jenny, and Rey (2002) capitalize on early characterizations by Lambson (1987, 1994) of optimal
punishments — possibly over several periods — for a class of infinitely repeated games with price-
setting sellers of a homogenous good. They examine the impact of the distribution of firm-specific
capacity constraints on the ability to sustain collusion. When capacity constraints are weak, in
that any subset of firms can serve the entire market, the Nash equilibrium of the stage game yields
zero profit. When aggregate capacity is limited vis-à-vis market size, it is shown that asymmetric
capacities make collusion more difficult to sustain. With no fixed cost and a constant marginal
cost normalized to zero, firms earn zero profit when they are minmaxed. This holds also when
the price is set to zero. Hence, the limited liability constraint associated to price non-negativity
can never be binding. Our analysis reveals that another factor would be at play if the marginal
cost were specified to be positive. In that case, the limited liability constraint would depend on
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each firm i’s capacity ki, with the lowest profit equal to −cki < 0, and it could be binding.
In Vasconcelos (2005), quantity-setting firms have a different share of the industry capital,
which determines their marginal costs. In a punishment period, the total industry output is
divided in proportion to capital endowments. The analysis focuses on maximum punishments.
They make a deviant firm earn its minmax payoff, that is zero (there are no fixed costs), from
the first period of punishment onward. In the terms of our paper, this is equivalent to assuming
that the firms’ punishment quantities are such that the participation constraint binds. When
this holds, an important result is that a one-period punishment penal code exists, where the
collusive action leads to monopoly profits (perfect collusion), if the discount factor is higher than
a threshold level that depends on the size of the largest firm. The introduction of our limited
liability constraint — which is a natural extension since demand is finite so that punishments are
structurally limited from below — would lead to a higher threshold for some parameter values. By
choosing simple values for the cost and demand parameters, we find that the above-mentioned
discount threshold remains unchanged only if the marginal cost parameter is sufficiently high.
More specifically, by setting (say) ki = 1/n for each firm i’s capital share (so that symmetry
is restored) and a = b = 1 for the linear demand curve parameters in Vasconcelos’ model, one
obtains that qP ≤ qP if and only if c ≥ sup {0, c(δ)}, where qP is the quantity such that both
(IC0) and (PC ), as defined in the present paper, are exactly satisfied, and qP is the quantity
that drives prices to zero.22 For c < sup {0, c(δ)}, the limited liability constraint binds, and a
one-period simple penal code is suboptimal.
7 Policy Implications
The systematic analysis of the role of a limited liability constraint has direct policy implications. It
points to a very simple regulatory mechanism which uses only prima facie observable information
(i.e., current transaction prices) and makes firms abandon collusion by iteration. To see that,
introduce another constraint which imposes that, in each period, a firm’s strategy a cannot be
more severe than aR (the subscript “R” here means “regulation”). Formally:
π(a) ≥ πR, (R)
22With ki = 1/n and a = b = 1, the discount threshold of Proposition 2 in Vasconcelos (2005, p. 48) reduces to
3 (n+ 2)n/ (2n+ 1)2. With δ at the latter level, we obtain c(δ) = 1/n.
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where πR ≡ π(aR). In practice, the policy instrument which corresponds to that constraint is a
price floor.23 The regulatory constraint (R) is formally identical to a limited liability constraint.
It can be made stronger than (MLLC ) by specifying that aP ¹ aR ¹ a∗m, which implies that
π ≤ πR ≤ π∗m, where π∗m ≡ π (a∗m).
Next, by substituting aR for aP in the expression of δ
0 (see Lemma 4), define δ0 (aR, am) ≡
πdi (am)−πm
πdi (am)−πdi (aR)
. For any given a, the monotonicity of the best-reply function πdi (.) implies that
δ0 (aR, am) > (=)δ
0 (a, am) for all aR Â (=)a, with limaR→am δ0 (aR, am) = +∞.24 Hence:
Remark 6. For any am ¹ a∗m and δ ≥ δ0 (aP , am) there exists aR º aP such that δ0 (aR, am) = δ.
It follows from the latter remark that, in principle, any given am can be made non imple-
mentable by adjusting aR continuously. Suppose that aR and am are such that δ
0 (aR, am) = δ.
Substituting a0R ≺ aR for aR in (R) relaxes the constraint, implying that δ0 (a0R, am) < δ, and collu-
sion is facilitated. On the other hand, substituting a0R Â aR for aR in (R), other things remaining
equal, implies that δ0 (a0R, am) > δ, hence am is not implementable. In that case, firms face only
two possibilities: (i) if there exists a0m (in the neighborhood of am) verifying δ
0 (a0R, a
0
m) ≤ δ, then
a0m is implementable; (ii) otherwise collusion cannot be sustained.
However, in practice only the transaction prices, as actually charged by the industry, can be
observed at some non prohibitive cost by the regulator. Whether firms collude or not cannot be
inferred from that information, because the Nash equilibrium strategy of the stage-game, aNE, is
a priori unknown.
A simple regulatory mechanism can be designed that circumvents this inference problem. Sup-
pose that the regulator sets limits to any reduction in transaction prices, starting from the observed
level. In more formal terms, am is the current action played by all firms, with aNE ¹ am ¹ a∗m.25
The regulator does not know whether the current am is a collusive action or not. Then, she
specifies that in the next period, the observed a1 must verify a1 º aR,1, where aR,1 is strictly
less profitable than the current industry action (i.e., aR,1 ≺ am), but only limitedly so (aR,1 is a
price slightly lower than the current transaction price in the Bertrand setup, or a quantity slightly
greater each firm’s current output in the Cournot specification). This is equivalent to introducing
(R), with πR = π(am)− , where the magnitude of  > 0 is small (so that aNE ≺ aR,1).
23The regulatory constraint is rewritten as pi ≥ pR in the Bertrand specification of the model, and as pi (q) ≥ pR
in the Cournot scenario, all i ∈ N .
24 In the appendix (Lemma A-2) we prove formally that πdi (a) ≥ πdi (a0), all a ºi a0.
25 In the Bertrand setup all firms initially charge pm, with pm ∈ [pNE , p∗m]. In the Cournot scenario pm = pi (qm),
with each firm i selling qm ∈ [q∗m, qNE ].
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Figure 4: Cournot linear setup, with the utility function (8), five firms, a homogeneous good, and constant unit
costs (n = 5, γ = 1, c = 1/10, δ = 3/5). Initially, all firms implement the collusive quantity q∗m. A price floor
rules out large price reductions (i.e., q ≤qR,1, with qR,1 above q
∗
m, but only limitedly so). A series of successive
adjustments from qR,1 to qR,2, qR,3, ... drives the industry toward the stage-game Nash point N .
Note that am satisfies the regulatory constraint, which does not call explicitly for any change
in the conduct of firms. At first glance, it merely rules out extreme variations in transaction prices,
and thereby overtly protects the industry from sharp reductions in instantaneous profits. If firms
do not collude, so that the current am results from a competitive behavior (i.e., am = aNE), the
constraint is clearly innocuous. Only in case of collusion, the constraint necessarily induces a
change in firms’ behavior.
In more technical terms, the firms’ reaction to the introduction of the regulatory constraint
depends on the status of am:
1) When firms do not collude initially, so that am = aNE, the constraint (R) plays no role.
Therefore, all firms keep playing the same stage-game equilibrium strategy.
2) When firms collude initially, so that aNE ≺ am ¹ a∗m, for all aR,1 sufficiently close to am
the regulatory constraint (R) binds in the punishment phase, so that δ0
¡
aR,1, a
¢
> δ for
all a ¹ am, and collusion cannot be sustained. Moreover, aR,1 Â aNE implies that each
individual stage-game best-reply strategy is also constrained by (R). As a consequence, all
firms switch from am to a1 = aR,1 (i.e., the constrained Nash equilibrium strategy), and
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only a small drop in the observable transaction price occurs (from pm to pR in the price
version of the model, and from pi
³
qm
´
to pi
³
qR
´
in the quantity setup). The process
can be repeated, step by step, by a controlled relaxation of the regulatory constraint, with
successive levels aR,1, aR,2, aR,3, . . . which are monotone “decreasing” in the order relation
¹ toward aNE.26
Example 2. Consider the Cournot linear specifications introduced in Section 5, with n = 5,
γ = 1, c = 1/10, and δ = 3/5. The “latent” limited liability constraint π(q) ≥ π, or equivalently
q ≤ qP , can be made stronger by introducing a price floor, as formalized by q ≤ qR,1, with
qR,1 < qP . With qR,1 strictly larger, but only limitedly so, than the collusive output qm, with
qNE ≤ qm ≤ q∗m, the regulator can initiate a series of adjustments ( qR,1, qR,2, ...) toward the
stage-game Nash equilibrium qNE (Fig. 4).
Two conditions are necessary for this incremental process not to stop before the industry is
driven to aNE. First, the diagonal aR = am, as represented in Figure 4 with quantity as a choice
variable, should not intersect the frontier δ0 (aR, am) = δ for all aR º aNE (i.e., for all qR ≤ qNE
in Figure 4). Otherwise the industry could implement aR,k as a collusive action, while pretending
that it actually competes. In that case the regulator could not check that the firms do not play
aNE when the collusive action remains equal to aR,k, with an observed track of adjustments
remaining on the diagonal regulatory path. We establish that the regulator is actually immune
from this moral hazard:
Lemma 5. Consider any implementable collusive am. Then aR Â aNE implies that am Â aR.
The second condition for the regulatory adjustment process to converge to aNE is that the
increments aR,k−aR,k−1 must be relatively small. Otherwise, when the process has reached a point
on the diagonal aR = am in the neighborhood of the frontier δ
0 (aR, am) = δ, the industry could
take advantage of a large increment to “leap” to a collusive point and stop the adjustment process.
(In Fig. 4 this would be represented by a horizontal jump from the diagonal path qR = qm to a
point in the shaded area between the critical frontier and the vertical line qR = qNE.) In other
words, after a finite number k of adjustments the process would permit firms to play an action
aR,k verifying δ
0 ¡aR,k, aR,k−1¢ ≤ δ. The regulatory constraint would be so weak as to permit
punishments at aR,k which are sufficiently severe to deter deviations from the collusive action
26Of course, anticipating the adjustment of the regulatory constraint aR results in a lower incentive to deviate
from collusion than actually specified by the constraint (3). Yet, as long as the price floor is sufficiently close to
the current collusive price to make it unsustainable, the regulatory constraint (R) is sufficiently strong to drive the
industry way from am.
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aR,k−1. Again the regulator would not be able to detect collusion, since the observed transaction
price, when all firms play aR,k−1, and stick to it, would be apparently compatible with a stop at
the unobservable aNE. This does not occur if the difference aR,k − aR,k−1 is infinitesimal.27 To
summarize:
Proposition 8. Suppose that firms implement am, with aNE ≺ am ¹ a∗m. By setting a price floor
slightly below the observed transaction price, and by reducing the floor by iteration, the regulator
makes the industry converge to the stage-game Nash equilibrium aNE .
Given that the diagonal aR = am cannot intersect the frontier δ
0 (aR, am) = δ in any case
(Lemma 5), and for sufficiently small increments aR,k − aR,k−1 (see previous footnote), any devi-
ation by firms from the regulatory process would necessarily signal to the regulator that they are
colluding. This will not occur in this framework if collusion is sufficiently penalized by monetary
payments (i.e., standard cartel prosecution). If aR,k − aR,k−1 is not that small, firms are able to
collude again (in Figure 4, by jumping to a collusive point in the shaded area), and the regulatory
process stops after a finite number of iterations. However the termination collusive action can be
made as close as desired to the one-shot Nash level by decreasing the size of increments.
8 Appendix
8.1 Single-Period Punishments
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that a = a∗P , the optimal punishment in the interior of A (it is
always possible to define A for this condition to hold), and δ = δ∗, the lowest possible discount
factor for which am is implementable. There are three possible cases: either the two inequalities
are slack, or only one, or none. Consider the first two cases in turn. (i) If none of the two con-
straints binds, observe that the two expressions on the RHS of the inequality sign are continuous
in δ and monotonically decreasing when the discount parameter is decreasing, so that there exists
δ0 < δ∗ such that the system still holds true when δ = δ0, contradicting the claim that δ∗ is a
lower bound. (ii) If exactly one constraint binds for δ = δ∗, recall that profit functions πdi (.) and
π(.) are continuous in firms’ choices, therefore by changing slightly the punishment action from
a∗P to a
0
P one can relax the binding constraint and still let the other inequality be verified. This
leads the two constraints (IC0) and (IC1) to be slack, implying again that there exists δ0 < δ∗
such that the system still holds true when δ = δ0. It follows from (i) and (ii) that both constraints
27Formally, the magnitude of the successive adjustments aR,k−aR,k−1 should be strictly less than the “distance”αk − aR,k−1
, where αk is defined by δ0

αk, aR,k

= δ.
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Figure A-1: The optimal punishment action a∗P is such that πdi (a∗P )− π(a∗P ) = πdi (am)− πm, given am (here
with aP ≺ a∗P ≺ aP ≺ a˜). As in Abreu (1986) the difference πdi (aP )− π(aP ) is unbounded from above if the
limited liability constraint is removed.
Proof of Proposition 1.We first introduce three intermediate results (Lemmas A-1 to A-3).
Lemma A-1. Given am, the optimal punishment action a∗P is such that π
d
i (a
∗
P ) − π(a∗P ) =
πdi (am)− πm. Hence a∗P = aˇ as defined in Assumption (A7).
Proof. The constraints in (IC0-IC1) can be rewritten as δ ≥ δ0 and δ ≥ δ00, respectively, with
δ0 ≡
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/ [πm − π(aP )] and δ00 ≡
£
πdi (aP )− π(aP )
¤
/ [πm − π(aP )]. Lemma 1 implies
that
δ∗ = δ0
¯¯
aP=a∗P
= δ00
¯¯
aP=a∗P
.
It is then sufficient to observe that the numerators of δ0 and δ00 are identical to conclude that the
numerators πdi (am)− πm and πdi (aP )− π(aP ) are also equal if aP = a∗P .
Lemma A-1 offers an implicit definition of a∗P and says that, in the stage game, a firm’s
incentive to deviate from a∗P is equal to the incentive to deviate from am (see Fig. A-1). Note
that, because a∗P = aˇ from Lemma A-1, where aˇ is as in Assumption (A7), by continuity of
πdi (.)− π(.), together with πdi (aNE)− π (aNE) = 0, the incentive to deviate from am is an upper
bound to a firm’s incentive to deviate, for any a that verifies a∗P ¹ a ¹ am.
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The next technical result establishes a monotonicity property.
Lemma A-2. πdi (a) ≥ πdi (a0), all a º a0.
Proof. Recall that πdi (a) ≡ πi
¡
adi (a−i) , a−i
¢
, with a−i ≡ a, and adi (a−i) ≡ argmaxai πi (ai, a−i).
From the definition of adi (a−i), we have πi
¡
adi (a−i) , a−i
¢
≥ πi
¡
adi
¡
a0−i
¢
, a−i
¢
, all a−i, a0−i. Next,
a ºi a0 here can be rewritten as a−i ºi a0−i, implying that πi
¡
adi
¡
a0−i
¢
, a−i
¢
≥ πi
¡
adi
¡
a0−i
¢
, a0−i
¢
.
This leads to πdi (a) ≥ πdi (a0) by transitivity.
A useful technical result is:
Lemma A-3. aP º a∗P if and only if a˜P º a∗P .
Proof. Sufficiency: If a∗P ¹ a˜P then πdi (a∗P ) ≤ 0 by (A5). Suppose that aP ≺ a∗P (which
implies that aP ≺ aNE because a˜P ¹ aNE from Assumption (A5)), and look for a contradiction.
First recall that, absent the limited liability constraint, profits π (a) are unbounded from below
by assumption, while best-reply profits πdi (a) have a lower bound (a firm may always stop selling
from Assumption (A6)). Hence πdi (a) − π (a) is unbounded from above (i.e., the difference is
strictly larger than the constant πdi (am)− πm for a sufficiently severe a in the absence of limited
liability constraint). Then suppose that πdi (aP )−π ≤ πdi (am)−πm, by continuity of πdi (.)−π (.)
there would exist a ≺ aP ≺ a∗P such that πdi (a)−π (a) = πdi (am)−πm, contradicting Lemma A-1
and Assumption (A7). Hence πdi (aP )−π > πdi (am)−πm. Next, by Lemma A-2, aP ≺ a∗P implies
πdi (aP ) ≤ πdi (a∗P ) hence πdi (aP ) ≤ 0. It follows that π < πm−πdi (am)+πdi (aP ) ≤ πm−πdi (am) ,
which clearly contradicts the definition of aP . As a result a˜P º a∗P implies aP º a∗P . Necessity:
If a˜P ≺ a∗P , suppose that aP º a∗P and look for a contradiction. By assumption aP ¹ am, and
clearly π < 0 implies aP ≺ am. By Lemma A-1 and (A7), a∗P ¹ aP ≺ am implies that πdi (aP )−π ≤
πdi (am)−πm. From the very definition of aP , it follows that πdi (aP ) ≤ 0 = πdi (a˜P ). By Lemma A-
2, this implies that aP ¹ a˜P and by transitivity through a˜P ≺ a∗P , that aP ≺ a∗P , a contradiction.
Hence aP º a∗P implies a˜P º a∗P .
The latter three technical results are useful to establish Proposition 1, as follows. There are
three steps. First we solve a less constrained version of (1), in which (PC ) and (LLC ) are absent.
Then we reintroduce each of the latter two constraints separately, one after another.
1) Consider the δ-minimization problem without constraints (PC ) and (LLC ). The two
constraints (IC0-IC1) can be rewritten together as
X (δ) ≤ πm − π(aP ) ≤ Y (δ, aP ) , (11)
whereX (δ) ≡
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/δ and Y (δ, aP ) ≡
£
πm − πdi (aP )
¤
/ (1− δ) denote the lower-bound
and the upper-bound, respectively, of the profit differential πm − π(aP ). (They are represented
37
in Fig. A-2.) We know that (a∗P , δ
∗) solves X (δ) = Y (δ, aP ) from Lemma 1.28 Together with
πdi (am)− πdi (a∗P ) = πm − π(a∗P ) from Lemma A-1, this leads to
δ∗ =
πdi (am)− πm
πm − π(a∗P )
. (12)
Then observe (i) from (IC1) that πdi (a
∗
P ) ≤ δπm+(1− δ)π(a∗P ); and (ii) that a∗P ≺ am implies
(1− δ) (π(a∗P )− πm) < 0, which can be rewritten as δπm + (1− δ)π(a∗P ) < πm. Then (i) and
(ii) together imply that πdi (a
∗
P ) < πm, and consequently π
d
i (a
∗
P ) − π(a∗P ) < πm − π(a∗P ). As the
difference on the LHS is equal to πdi (am)− πm from Lemma A-1, we obtain that πdi (am)− πm <
πm − π(a∗P ), which implies from (12) that δ∗ < 1.
2) Introduce (PC ), in addition to (IC0-IC1). For aP = a∗P , recall that the latter two con-
straints imply X (δ) ≤ πm−π(a∗P ) ≤ Y (δ, a∗P ), while the participation constraint can be rewritten
πm − π(a∗P ) ≤ Y (δ), with Y (δ) ≡ πm/ (1− δ).
δ
ππ −≡ mY
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)(δX
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Figure A-2: The two ICs in (IC0-IC1) can be rewritten X (δ) ≤ πm − π(aP ) ≤ Y (δ, aP ), with
X (δ) ≡

πdi (am)− πm

/δ and Y (δ, aP ) ≡

πm − πdi (aP )

/ (1− δ). Similarly, PC can be rewritten
πm − π(a∗P ) ≤ Y (δ), with Y (δ) ≡ πm/(1− δ), and LLC can be rewritten πm − π(a∗P ) ≤ Y , where Y ≡ πm − π.
When PC and LLC are absent, the optimal punishment a∗P and the threshold δ
∗ are such that X(δ∗, a∗P ) = Y (δ
∗).
Here a∗P ≺ aP ≺ aP , therefore LLC binds. The limited liability constrained optimal punishment is aP , and firms
may implement am for all δ ≥ δ. The latter discount threshold is implicitly defined by X (δ) = Y .
28Deviation profits πdi (aP ) have a lower bound (a firm may always stop selling; see (A6)), all aP . Therefore
limδ→0X (δ) = +∞ > Y (0, aP ) = πm − πdi (aP ), and X (1) = πdi (am) − πm < limδ→1 Y (δ, aP ) = +∞. Hence
there always exists δ∗(aP ) in [0, 1) verifying X (δ∗(aP )) = Y (δ∗(aP ), aP ), all aP .
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There are two cases:
(i) If aP ≺ a∗P then a˜P ≺ a∗P , from Lemma A-3. Then we know from (PC ) that Y (δ) > Y (δ, a∗P )
for all δ ∈ [0, 1), and the participation constraint is slack for aP = a∗P and δ = δ∗.
(ii) If a∗P ¹ aP then a∗P ¹ a˜P , from Lemma A-3. Then we know from (PC ) that Y (δ) ≤ Y (δ, a∗P )
for all δ ∈ [0, 1). When the inequality sign is strict, (PC ) is violated for aP = a∗P and δ = δ∗.
Next, toward a participation-constrained solution, substitute (PC ) for (IC1), or equivalently
Y (δ) for Y (δ, aP )in (11). (See Fig. A-2.) The negative slope of X (δ), the positive slope of Y (δ),
together with the continuity of π(.), imply that the minimizer aP and the minimum δ verify
X
¡
δ
¢
= πm − π = Y
¡
δ
¢
.29 This leads to
δ =
πdi (am)− πm
πm − π
, (13)
and then one checks that Y
¡
δ
¢
≤ Y
¡
δ, aP
¢
. Recalling that π = πm − πdi (am) by (implicit)
definition aP , from (13) we have δ < 1 if and only if πdi (am)−πm < πm−
¡
πm − πdi (am)
¢
, which
is true for all πm > 0.
(iii) Clearly if aP Â (=)aP , then any (δ, aP ), with δ ≥ δ, also verifies (LLC ).
3) Introduce (LLC ), in addition to (IC0-IC1). Observe that the limited liability constraint
can be rewritten πm − π(aP ) ≤ Y , where Y ≡ πm − π. There are two cases:
(i) If aP ≺ a∗P we have π < π (a∗P ), hence (LLC ) is slack for aP = a∗P , all δ.
(ii) If a∗P ¹ aP , we know from (LLC ) that Y ≤ X (δ∗) = πm − π(a∗P ) = Y (δ∗, a∗P ). When the
inequality sign is strict (LLC ) is violated for aP = a∗P and δ = δ
∗. Next, toward a limited liability
constrained solution, one substitutes (LLC ) for (IC1), or equivalently Y for Y (δ, aP ) in (11).
(See Fig. A-2.) Because Y is a constant, the slope of X (δ) is negative, and π(.) is continuous,
the minimizer aP and the minimum δ verify X (δ) = πm − π = Y .30 This leads to
δ =
πdi (am)− πm
πm − π
. (14)
Then a∗P ¹ aP ¹ am together with assumption (A7) imply that δ ≥ π
d
i (aP )−π
πm−π , hence that
Y ≤ Y (δ, aP ). It is obvious from (14) that δ < (=)1 if and only if π < (=)πm−
¡
πdi (am)− πm
¢
.
(iii) Clearly if aP Â (=)aP , then any (δ, aP ), with δ ≥ δ, also verifies (PC ). ¥
29Note that limδ→0X (δ) = +∞ > Y (0) = πm together with limδ→1X (δ) = πdi (am)−πm < limδ→1 Y (δ) = +∞
imply that there always exists δ in [0, 1) verifying X

δ

= Y

δ

.
30Since X (δ) is downward sloping, and limδ→0X (δ) = +∞ > X, there exists δ in [0, 1) verifying X (δ) = Y if and
only if limδ→1X (δ) < Y . This condition holds from Assumption (A8). Otherwise am would not be implementable.
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8.2 Multi-Period Punishments
We first prove Lemma 2, which is needed in the proof of Proposition 2, that follows.
Proof of Lemma 2. In (MIC 0), the expression on the RHS of the weak inequality sign simplifies
to
Xl
k=1
δk [πm − π(aP,k)]. It is clearly monotone increasing when either aP,k decreases, all k ≥ 1,
or when δ increases, the LHS expression (which does not depend on punishment levels) remaining
constant. In (MIC 1), the expression on the RHS of the weak inequality sign can be rewritten
δ [(1− δ)V1 (aP , δ)− π (aP,1)]. It is monotone increasing when aP,k increases (since δ (1− δ) > 0),
for all k > 1, the LHS expression (a function of aP,1 only) remaining constant. Then for any given
aP,1, suppose that aP,2, . . . , aP,l are such that δ takes the lowest possible value for which (MIC 0-
MIC 1) hold true. There are three possible cases: either the two inequalities are slack, or only
one, or none. (i) If none of the two constraints binds, by continuity, one may obviously reduce δ
by an arbitrarily small amount so that both constraints remain verified, contradicting the claim
that there is no lower discount factor verifying (MIC 0) and (MIC 1). (ii) If exactly one of the
two constraints binds, pick any k > 1 such that aP,k ≺ am. Then by continuity, one may reduce
δ and adjust aP,k so that the RHS expression of the binding constraint remains constant, while
the other constraint remains satisfied, contradicting again the initial supposition. Therefore it
must be the case that, given aP,1, (MIC 0-MIC 1) hold with an equality sign when aP,2, . . . , aP,l
are such that δ is minimized. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. There are two steps: (1) We investigate a less constrained version of
(7) by leaving aside the last l − 1 multi-period incentive constraints together with (MPC ) and
(MLLC ), to keep only (MIC 0) and (MIC 1). This is done by capitalizing on Lemma 2: we solve
in (δ, V1) the system (MIC 0-MIC 1) with equality signs, to obtain (δ∗(aP,1), V1(aP , δ∗(aP,1)));
then we identify the level of aP,1that minimizes δ∗(aP,1) under the feasibility constraint that
V1(aP , δ∗(aP,1)) ≤ Vl (aP , δ∗(aP,1)) = πm/ (1− δ∗(aP,1)). This leads to the minimizer a∗P,1 = a∗P .
(2) We show that (δ∗(a∗P ), V1(aP , δ
∗(a∗P ))) satisfies all incentive constraints in (MIC 0-MIC l) as
well as (MPC -MLLC ).
(1) Consider the δ-minimization problem with the two incentive constraints (MIC 0) and (MIC 1)
only. Observing that Vl (aP , δ) = V0 (am, δ), the two constraints become
X (δ) ≤ V0 (am, δ)− V0 (aP , δ) ≤ Y (δ, aP,1) , (15)
where X (δ) ≡
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/δ and Y (δ, aP,1) ≡
£
πm − πdi (aP,1)
¤
/ (1− δ) denote the lower-
bound and the upper-bound, respectively, of the value differential V0 (am, δ) − V0 (aP , δ) =
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V0 (am, δ)− π (aP,1)− δV1 (aP , δ). Given aP,1, from Lemma 2 we know that (15) must hold with
an equality sign throughout for δ to be minimized. Solving X (δ) = Y (δ, aP ) in (δ, V1(aP , δ)), we
find
δ∗(aP,1) =
πdi (am)− πm
πdi (am)− πdi (aP,1)
, (16)
and
V1(aP , δ∗(aP,1)) =
h
πdi (am)− πdi
¡
a∗P,1
¢i⎛⎝πdi
³
a∗P,1
´
− π
³
a∗P,1
´
πdi (am)− πm
+
πdi
³
a∗P,1
´
πm − πdi
³
a∗P,1
´
⎞
⎠ . (17)
Observe from the monotonicity of πdi (aP,1) in aP,1 (Lemma A-2) that δ
∗(aP,1) is monotone non-
decreasing in aP,1. Therefore the lowest value of δ∗(aP,1) is obtained for the most severe first-period
punishment aP,1 compatible with the feasibility constraints of the problem. Note in particular from
(5) that aP,1 must be such that Vs (aP , δ) ≤ Vt (aP , δ) ≤ Vl (aP , δ) = πm/ (1− δ), all s ≤ t ≤ l.
Then V1 (aP , δ) ≤ πm/ (1− δ), together with (16) and (17), becomesh
πm − πdi (aP,1)
iµ
1− π
d
i (aP,1)− π (aP,1)
πdi (am)− πm
¶
≥ 0. (18)
Clearly πm−πdi (aP,1) for all aP,1 ¹ aNE (since the monotonicity of πdi (aP ) implies that πdi (aP,1) ≤
πdi (aNE) = π(aNE), while π(aNE) < πm for all aNE ≺ am). It follows from (18) that the term
between rounded brackets must be non-negative. This implies that
πdi (aP,1)− π (aP,1) ≤ πdi (am)− πm. (19)
Recalling from Lemma A-1 that πdi (a
∗
P )−π(a∗P ) = πdi (am)−πm, from Assumption (A7) we obtain
that aP,1 cannot be strictly more severe than a∗P .
(2) Substitute a∗P for aP,1 in (16 − 17), and also πdi (am) − πm for πdi (a∗P ) − π(a∗P ), again from
Lemma A-1, to obtain
δ∗(a∗P ) = δ
∗ ≡ π
d
i (am)− πm
πdi (am)− πdi
¡
a∗P
¢ ,
and
V ∗1 (a
∗
P , δ
∗(a∗P )) =
πm
1− δ∗ .
It follows directly from the later equation that V ∗1 (a
∗
P , δ
∗(a∗P )) = Vl(aP , δ
∗(a∗P )), implying that
π
³
a∗P,k
´
= πm, all k > 1. This says that a∗P = (a
∗
P , am, . . . , am) when the only the two incentive
constraints in (MIC 0) and (MIC 1 are considered. Next, observe from the definition of contin-
uation profits in (5) that a∗P,k = am, all k > 1, implies that V1 (a
∗
P , δ) = Vs (a
∗
P , δ), all s. It
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follows that the last l− 1 multi-period incentive constraints are all identical to the first one, that
is (MIC 0), implying that all constraints in (MIC 0-MIC l) are satisfied. Since a∗P º aP , aP it is
also plain that (MPC ) and (MLLC ) are satisfied. Therefore the solution to the less constrained
problem is also a solution to (7), and the punishment (a∗P , am, . . . , am) is optimal. ¥
We now prove Lemma 3, which is needed in the proof of Proposition 3, that follows.
Proof of Lemma 3. The threshold δ =
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/πdi (am) follows directly from the com-
parison of (MIC 0 and (MPC ) for s = 0. This threshold does not differ from δ, as introduced in
Proposition 1, since the denominator πdi (am) = πm − π from the implicit definition of aP . ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. There are two steps: (1) In addition to (MIC 0) and (MIC 1), we
introduce (MPC ) in the less constrained version of (7), the last l − 1 multi-period incentive
constraints and (MLLC ) being left aside. We show that (MPC ) is stronger than (IC1) if a∗P ¹ a˜P .
Then am is implementable with the l-period punishment aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am) if δ = δ, that is
the lower bound to the interval of δ for which (MIC 0) and (MPC ) are compatible. (2) We obtain
that (δ,aP ) satisfies all other incentive constraints (MIC 2-MIC l), in which case δ is a solution
of (7) and aP is optimal.
(1) Introduce the multi-period participation constraint (MPC ) in addition to (MIC 0-MIC l). For
aP = a
∗
P ≡ (a∗P , am, . . . , am) recall that the first two incentive constraints in (MIC 0) and (MIC 1)
can be rewritten X (δ) ≤ V0 (am, δ) − V0 (a∗P , δ) ≤ Y (δ,a∗P ), while (MPC ) can be rewritten
V0 (am, δ)− V0 (a∗P , δ) ≤ Y (δ), with Y (δ) ≡ πm/ (1− δ). If aP º a∗P we know from Lemma A-3
that a˜P º a∗P , in which case πdi (a∗P ) ≤ 0 from (A5). This implies that Y (δ) ≤ Y (δ, a∗P ) for any
δ ∈ [0, 1). When the inequality sign is strict (MPC ) is stronger than (MIC 1), and thus is violated
for aP = a∗P and δ = δ
∗. Next, toward a participation-constrained solution, substitute (MPC )
for (MIC 1). From Proposition 1, in the single-period punishment case we know that (IC0) and
(PC ) are satisfied if aP = aP and δ ≥ δ, implying that in the multi-period setup (MIC 0) and
(MPC ) are satisfied as well if aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am) and δ ≥ δ. This is sufficient to conclude that
there is at least one punishment aP for which am is implementable with δ ≥ δ. Then recall from
Lemma 3 that δ is the lowest value of δ compatible with (MIC 0) and (MPC ). This is sufficient
to conclude that δ is a solution to the δ-minimization problem under the constraints (MIC 0),
(MIC 1), (MPC ).
(2) Observe from the definition of continuation profits in (5) that aP,k = am for all k > 1 implies
that Vs (aP , δ) = V0 (am, δ), all s > 1. It follows the last l − 1 multi-period incentive constraints
are all identical to (MIC 0), implying that all constraints in (MIC 0-MIC l) are satisfied. Clearly
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if aP Â (=)aP , then
¡
δ,aP
¢
also verifies (MLLC ). Therefore δ is a solution to (7), and the
punishment (aP , am, . . . , am) is optimal, all l. ¥
Proof of Lemma 4. First, recall from Lemma 2 that, given aP,1, the lowest discount factor δ
verifying (MIC 0) and (MIC 1) results from punishment actions aP,k, with k > 1, such that both
(MIC 0) and (MIC 1) bind. This implies that (15) must hold with an equality sign throughout.
The solution in (δ, V1) is (δ∗(aP,1),V1(aP , δ∗(aP,1))), with
δ∗(aP,1) =
πdi (am)− πm
πdi (am)− πdi (aP,1)
,
where the monotonicity of πdi (aP,1) in aP,1 (Lemma A-2) implies that δ
∗(aP,1) is monotone non-
decreasing in aP,1. Next, introduce the constraint (MLLC ), which is equivalent to aP,1 º aP .
Then substitute aP for aP,1 to find δ
∗(aP ) = δ
0. ¥
Proof of Remark 3. Recall from proof of Proposition 3 that (MIC 0) is written as X (δ) ≤
V0 (am, δ)−V0 (aP , δ), and (MPC ) as V0 (am, δ)−V0 (aP , δ) ≤ Y (δ), withX (δ) ≡
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/δ
and Y (δ) ≡ πm/ (1− δ). If (aP , δ) = (aP , δ) and aP Â a∗P we know that X
¡
δ
¢
= V0
¡
am, δ
¢
−
V0
¡
aP , δ
¢
= Y (δ), where aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am), while all other multi-period incentive constraints
are satisfied also. Given δ, consider a change from aP to a0P , with a
0
P,1 Â aP and a0P,k ¹ am for
some k > 1, that verifies V0 (aP , δ) − V0 (a0P , δ) = 0. For all l > 1, the continuity of π(aP,k) in
aP,k implies that the number of solutions a0P to the latter equation is infinite. By the very nature
of the change both constraints (MIC 0) and (MPC ) remain exactly satisfied, while by continuity
(MIC 1) remains satisfied as well for a sufficiently small adjustment (it was slack for aP,1 = aP ).
Moreover, the l − 1 remaining multi-period incentive constraints in (MIC 2-MIC l) are relaxed
as a result of an adjustment from am “down” to a0P,k ≺ am in any of the k > 1 following pe-
riods of punishment, all other things remaining equal. It follows that am is implementable if
(aP , δ) = (a0P , δ). ¥
In this appendix we introduce two additional technical results we need in order to prove
Proposition 4.
Lemma A-4. For all V verifying π < (1− δ)V ≤ πm, there exists a finite l and a punishment
aP ≡ (aP , aP,2, . . . , aP,k, . . . , aP,l), with aP,k º aP for all k > 1, such that V1 (aP , δ) = V .
Proof. There are three steps: (1) we show that, given any δ, for any l ≥ 2 there exists a
punishment alP of length l such that V1 (aP , δ) = V for any V in a closed interval Il we define;
(2) we establish that the upper-bound of Il+1 is the lower bound of Il so that their finite union
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IL = ∪Ll=1Il is itself a closed interval; (3) we conclude by evidencing that the lower and upper
bounds of the union of intervals are respectively π/ (1− δ) and πm/ (1− δ).
(1) Define alP ≡ (alP,1, alP,2, . . . , alP,k, . . . , alP,l), where alP,k = aP for all k = 1, 2, . . . , l − 1, and
alP º aP . Here firms opt for the most severe action aP in the first l − 1 periods, and for a
possibly softer action in the l-th period. In the latter final period, the continuity of π in alP
implies that π(alP ) may take any value in [π(aP ), πm]. Let a
l
P and a
l
P denote the just defined
penal code alP where a
l
P,l = aP and a
l
P,l = am respectively. By definition, for any value V in
Il = [V1
¡
alP , δ
¢
, V1
¡
alP , δ
¢
], there exists alP such that V1
¡
alP , δ
¢
= V .
(2) Clearly, V1
¡
alP , δ
¢
= V1
³
al+1P , δ
´
so that IL = ∪Ll=1Il = [V1
¡
aLP , δ
¢
, V1
¡
a1P , δ
¢
] for any integer
L > 1.
(3) From the definition of continuation profits in (5) we know that V1
¡
a1P , δ
¢
= πm/ (1− δ), while
V1
¡
aLP , δ
¢
verifies
(1− δ)V1
¡
aLP , δ
¢
= π + δl−1 (πm − π) .
Since limL→∞(π+δL−1 (πm − π)) = π, for any V > π/ (1− δ) there exists a finite L such that
π+ δL−1 (πm − π) ≤ (1− δ)V so that V ∈ [V1
¡
aLP , δ
¢
, V1
¡
a1P , δ
¢
], and there exists a punishment
profile alP , with l ≤ L, such that V1
¡
alP , δ
¢
= V .
We may now use Lemma A-4.
Proof of Proposition 4. As we are interested in establishing implementability for δ ≥ δM ≡
sup{δ, δ0}, there are two cases that depend on the comparison of δ0 and δ. In both cases: (1)
we establish that there exists a finite punishment, we denote aP , which is such that V1 (aP , δ) is
equal to a particular value we explicit; (2) we check that all incentive constraints are satisfied; (3)
we also verify that the participation and limited liability constraints hold.
(δ0 ≥ δ ⇒ δM = δ0)
(1) Define implicitly aP , specified to take the form of a
l
P as introduced in Lemma A-4 (so that
(MLLC ) is satisfied) by
V1 (aP , δ) =
1
1− δ
µ
π +
πdi (aP )− π
δ
¶
(20)
which describes continuation profits from the 2nd period of punishment onward.31 Given δ, from
Lemma A-4 a sufficient condition for aP to be well defined is π < (1− δ)V1 (aP , δ) ≤ πm. To
31 In order to obtain the expression in (20), substitute aP for aP,1, and aP for aP , in (MIC 1) written with an
equality sign, and reorganize terms.
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check this holds, consider the two inequalities in turn: (i) We have π < (1− δ)V1 (aP , δ) since£
πdi (aP )− π
¤
/δ > 0 (by definition), for all δ > 0. (ii) Toward V1 (aP , δ) ≤ πm/(1− δ) first note
that aP º a∗P implies that πdi (am) − πm ≥ πdi (aP ) − π(aP ) from Assumption (A7) and Lemma
A-1. From the expression of δ0, as displayed in Lemma 4, it follows that
δ0 ≤ π
d
i (am)− πm
πm − π(aP )
. (21)
Then pick δ = δ0. Now (21), and X
¡
δ0
¢
≡
£
πdi (am)− πm
¤
/δ0 = V0
¡
am, δ0
¢
− V0
¡
aP , δ
0¢, imply
that πm − π(aP ) ≤ V0
¡
am, δ0
¢
− V0
¡
aP , δ
0¢. Moreover, substituting ¡1− δ0¢V0 ¡am, δ0¢ for πm
in the latter expression leads to V0
¡
aP , δ
0¢ ≤ δ0V0 ¡am, δ0¢ + π(aP ). Then substituting π(aP ) +
δ0V1
¡
aP , δ
0¢ for V0 ¡aP , δ0¢ results in ¡1− δ0¢V1 ¡aP , δ0¢ ≤ πm, as needed. As (1− δ)V1 (aP , δ) is
monotone decreasing in δ, it follows that (1− δ)V1 (aP , δ) ≤ πm for all δ ≥ δ0. Eventually, (i)
and (ii) establish that there exists at least one aP for a finite l such that V1 (aP , δ) satisfies (20)
for all δ ≥ δ0.
(2) Recall from the proof of Lemma 4 that for collusion to be implemented at δ = δ0, it must be the
case that the two constraints (MIC 0) and (MIC 1) are binding and that aP,1 = aP . Therefore,
for aP = aP ≡ (aP , aP , . . . , aP , aP,l), where aP,l º aP (i.e., the same vector as introduced in
the proof of Lemma A-4), if δ = δ0 we have that (MIC 0-MIC 1) are exactly satisfied. Clearly,
Vk+1 (aP , δ) is strictly increasing in k as long as 1 ≤ k ≤ l − 1. Since πdi
¡
aP,k
¢
− π(aP,k) is
identical for all 1 ≤ k ≤ l − 1, if (MIC 1) holds and is binding, it must be the case that all
constraints (MIC 2) , . . . , (MIC l − 1) hold also and are slack. Finally, to check that the last
incentive constraint (MIC l) is also satisfied, we compare it with (MIC 0). First, observe that the
terms on the RHS of the inequality sign are the same in the two constraints, because Vl (aP , δ) =
V0 (am, δ), all aP . Next, consider the terms on the LHS of the inequality side of (MIC l). There is
no loss of generality in assuming that aP,l ≺ am. (If there is equality, collusion can be implemented
by the means of a l − 1 punishment scheme where aP,l−1 = aP ≺ am). Assuming this is the case,
we know from Assumption (A7) and Lemma A-1 that πdi (aP,l)−π(aP,l) < (=)πdi (am)−πm, for all
aP,l Â (=)a∗P (as in the present case, since here aP,l º aP º a∗P ). Therefore, if (MIC 0) holds and
is binding, it must be the case that (MIC l) holds also and is slack. This says that, in the absence
of participation constraint, am is implementable with at least one l-punishment vector, that is
aP = aP , when δ = δ
0. Since for aP = aP all MIC s (MIC 0-MIC l) are monotone increasing in
δ, this also holds for all δ ≥ δ0.
(3) Consider now the participation constraint. If δ ≤ δ0, then the comparison of the developed
expressions for the two thresholds implies that πdi (am)−πdi (aP ) ≤ πm−π. Since π = πm−πdi (am)
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by definition, we have πdi (aP ) ≥ 0. Since V0 (aP , δ) = π + δV1 (aP , δ), with V1 (aP , δ) as in (20),
and aP as defined above in (1), we have V0 (aP , δ) ≥ 0, which says that the participation constraint
(MPC ) is also satisfied for aP = aP and δ ≥ δ0. This says that am is implementable with a finite
punishment scheme for all δ ≥ δ0. Then recall from Lemma 4 that the lowest δ compatible with
(MIC 0-MIC 1) and (MLLC ) is δ0. It follows that δ0 is the lowest possible discount factor that
implements am.
(δ > δ0 ⇒ δM = δ)
(1) We proceed as in the previous case to define implicitly a¯P by
V1 (a¯P , δ) = −
π
δ
. (22)
Again, we must check that a¯P satisfies the sufficient condition introduced in Lemma A-4, that is
π < − (1−δ)δ π ≤ πm, for all δ ≥ δ.32 The LHS inequality is always satisfied for δ ∈ (0, 1]. On the
RHS, aP º aP implies that π ≥ π = πm−πdi (am), recalling that the latter equality is the implicit
definition of aP . As a result −(
1−δ)
δ
π ≤ πm, which extends to any δ ≥ δ by monotonicity. Hence
there exists at least one a¯P for a finite l such that V1 (a¯P , δ) satisfies (22) for any δ ≥ δ.
(2) At δ = δ, we check that (MIC 0-MIC 1) are satisfied for aP = a¯P ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am), so that
aP,1 = aP , and (MLLC ) is satisfied by construction). Indeed X
¡
δ
¢
= V0
¡
am, δ
¢
− V0
¡
a¯P , δ
¢
<
Y
¡
δ, aP
¢
with X
¡
δ
¢
= πdi (am), Y
¡
δ, aP
¢
= πdi (am)
³
1− π
d
i (aP )
πm
´
> πdi (am) since π
d
i (aP ) < 0,
and V0
¡
am, δ
¢
−V0
¡
a¯P , δ
¢
= V0
¡
am, δ
¢
= πm
1−δ = π
d
i (am). Again, Vk+1 (a¯P , δ) is strictly increasing
in k as long as 1 ≤ k ≤ l− 1. Since πdi (aP,k)−π(aP,k) is identical for all 1 ≤ k ≤ l− 1, if (MIC 1)
is satisfied, it must be the case all constraints (MIC 1) , . . . , (MIC l − 1) are also satisfied. As
for the last incentive constraint, that is (MIC l), we compare it with (MIC 0). The terms on the
RHS of the inequality sign are the same in the two constraints, because Vl (aP , δ) = V0 (am, δ),
all aP . On the LHS, there is no loss of generality in assuming that aP,l ≺ am. (If there is
equality, collusion can be implemented by the means of a l−1 punishment scheme where aP,l−1 =
aP ≺ am). Assuming this is the case, we know from Assumption (A7) and Lemma A-1 that
πdi (aP,l) − π(aP,l) < πdi (am) − πm, for all aP,l Â (=)a∗P , as in the present case. Therefore, if
(MIC 0) holds and is binding, it must be the case that (MIC l) holds also and is slack. We obtain
that all incentive constraints are satisfied. Again, since for aP = a¯P all MICs (MIC 0-MIC l)
are monotone increasing in δ, this also holds for all δ ≥ δ.
32 In order to obtain the expression in (22), substitute aP for aP,1, and a¯P for aP , in (MPC ) written with an
equality sign for s = 0, and reorganize terms.
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(3) By construction, from (22), V0 (a¯P , δ) = 0 hence (MPC ) is satisfied for all δ. Given the
structure of a¯P , (MLLC ) is also satisfied. This says that am is implementable with a finite
punishment scheme for all δ ≥ δ. Then recall from Lemma 3 that the lowest δ compatible with
(MIC 0-MIC 1) and (MPC ) is δ. It follows that δ is the lowest possible discount factor that
implements am. ¥
Proof of Remark 4. Consider again the punishment profile of Lemma A-4, that is alP ≡
(alP,1, a
l
P,2, . . ., a
l
P,k, . . . , a
l
P,l), where a
l
P,k = aP for all k = 1, 2, . . . , l − 1, and alP,l º aP . We
know from Proposition 4 that there exists a punishment profile of this kind that allows firms to
implement am for δ = δM . We also have shown that, for this punishment profile, the (MIC l)
constraint holds and is slack. One may construct a l + 1 period punishment profile identical to
alP up to the period k = l − 1 and with a˚P,l Â alP,l and a˚P,l+1 ≺ am such that
π (aP,l) + δπm = π (˚aP,l) + δπ (˚aP,l+1)
and all incentive constraints are satisfied. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5. It is assumed that aP Â a∗P , aP . To see that δM < δ, recall that
δM ≡ sup{δ0, δ} and consider the two possible cases: (i) If δM = δ then it suffices to recall
that aP Â a∗P , aP implies δ > δ (see Remark 1) to conclude. (ii) If δM = δ0 then compare the
expressions of the denominators of δ0 and δ. We have πdi (am) − πdi (aP ) > πm − π if and only if
πdi (am) − πm > πdi (aP ) − π. To establish the latter property, recall from Assumption (A7) that
there exists a unique aˇ ≺ am such that πdi (am)− πm = πdi (aˇ)− π (aˇ), and from Lemma A-1 that
aˇ = a∗P . Therefore, here aP 6= a∗P implies that either πdi (am) − πm < πdi (aP ) − π, which is not
possible (the incentive to deviate from am is an upper bound to a firm’s incentive to deviate from
any a, see comment below Lemma A-1), or πdi (am)− πm > πdi (aP )− π, which thus holds.
For the comparison of δM with the other discount thresholds, there are two cases. Suppose
first that a∗P º aP , to compare δM with δ∗ (regime 1). From Remark 2 we obtain directly that
δ∗ < δM . Suppose next that aP Â a∗P , to compare δM with δ (regime 2). From the definition
of δM we obtain directly that δM ≥ δ. Finally, to demonstrate that δM = δ if and only if
a˜P º aP Â aP Â a∗P , note that a˜P º aP if and only if πdi (aP ) ≤ 0 from Assumption (A5), and
equivalently πdi (am)−πdi (aP ) ≥ πdi (am). Recalling that πm−π = πdi (am) by (implicit) definition
of aP , it follows that a˜P º aP if and only if δ ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πm−π =
πdi (am)−πm
πdi (am)
≥ δ0 ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πdi (am)−πdi (aP )
,
establishing that δM = δ (by definition), as needed. ¥
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8.3 A Linear Example
In this appendix we compute the specific algebraic expressions we need for the analysis of the
linear example in Section 5. Inverse demand functions for firm i and all other symmetric firms j
are given by (9) and (10). Therefore symmetric profits are
π(q) =
(
(1− q (1 + γ(n− 1))− c)q if q ≤ qP ≡
1
1+γ(n−1)
−cq if q ≥ qP
, (23)
where the piecewise structure results from the non-negativity constraint we impose on prices (solve
1− qi − γ(n− 1)qj ≥ 0 for qi = qj = q to find q ≤ qP ≡
1
(1+γ(n−1))). The collusive quantity and
corresponding profits are q∗m =
1−c
2(1+γ(n−1)) and π
∗
m =
(1−c)2
4(1+γ(n−1)) , respectively (there is perfect
collusion, with π∗m ≡ π (q∗m)). The one-shot best deviation profits are
πdi (q) =
(
1
4 (1− c− γ (n− 1) q)
2 if q ≤ q˜P ≡ 1−cγ(n−1)
0 otherwise
, (24)
where q˜P is the solution to πdi (q) = 0 (here f = 0 implies q˜P = qˆP , see (A5) and (A6)). Since
q∗m < q˜P for all parameter values, firm i’s best-reply profits, when each firm in N\{i} sells q∗m,
are πdi (q
∗
m) =
(1−c)2
16
(γ(n−1)+2)2
(1+γ(n−1))2 , from (24).
8.3.1 Implementability (feasibility of collusion)
In the single-period benchmark set-up (Section 3), consider the expression of δ in (2). We have
δ ≤ 1 if and only if c ≥ c˜, where
c˜ ≡
γ2 (n− 1)2 + 4 (γ (n− 1) + 1)− 4
q
γ2 (n− 1)2 (1 + γ (n− 1))
γ2 (n− 1)2 − 4 (γ (n− 1) + 1)
,
which is the only admissible root to π = π∗m−
¡
πdi (q
∗
m)− π∗m
¢
, the second root being negative for
all γ, n. Given n ≥ 2, we have c˜ ≥ 0 if on and only if γ ≥ γˇ ≡ 21+
√
2
n−1 . Note that inf {γˇ, 1} = 1 if
and only if n < 6. Hence c˜ is positive only when n ≥ 6. In that case, q∗m cannot be implemented
with a single-period scheme for all c < c˜ (see Fig. 1).
Now we check that q∗m can always be implemented for some δ sufficiently high in the multi-
period punishment case (Section 4). Recall that δM ≡ sup{δ0, δ}. We know from Lemma 3 that
δ < 1 for all π∗m > 0, and from Lemma 4 that δ
0 < 1 if and only if πdi
³
qP
´
< π∗m. Then from (24)
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there are two cases: if c > 11+γ(n−1) , or equivalently qP > q˜P , we have π
d
i
³
qP
´
= 0 < π∗m for all
π∗m > 0; otherwise πdi
³
qP
´
< π∗m if and only if 0 ≤ c ≤ c˜0, where
c˜0 ≡ 1p
1 + γ (n− 1)
.
This is the only admissible root to πdi
³
qP
´
= π∗m, the second root being negative for all γ, n.
Then it is sufficient to observe that c˜0 > 11+γ(n−1) to verify that π
d
i
³
qP
´
< π∗m.
8.3.2 Calculation of the discount thresholds
For all qP > q∗m one must consider the two forms of πdi (qP ), that depend on the comparison of qP
with q˜P . This leads to two cases:
(1) If qP ≤ q˜P ≡ 1−cγ(n−1) best-reply profits are πdi (qP ) =
1
4 (1− c− γ (n− 1)) q)
2 and (PC )
is slack. When only (IC0) and (IC1) are considered, we know (from Lemma 1) that the
optimal punishment q∗P is a solution in qP of π
d
i (qP )−π (qP ) = πdi (q∗m)−π∗m. The only two
solutions are q∗m, which does not apply as a punishment; the other one is
q∗P =
1− c
2
3γ(n− 1) + 2
[2 + γ(n− 1)] [1 + γ(n− 1)] .
The latter punishment quantity is defined only when lower than q˜P , which holds if and only
if γ ≤ inf {γˇ, 1}, recalling that γˇ ≡ 21+
√
2
n−1 and inf {γˇ, 1} = 1 if and only if n < 6. The
threshold value for δ is
δ∗ =
1
16
[2 + γ (n− 1)]2
1 + γ (n− 1) < 1. (25)
This is Regime 1 (see (2)). Next, we find q∗P ≤ qP , so that the price pi(q
∗
P , q
∗
P ) is non-negative
and (LLC ) is slack if and only if c ≥ c0, with
c0 ≡ γ (n− 1)− 2
3γ(n− 1) + 2 . (26)
The frontier c0 intersects the line c = 0 from below at γ = γˆ ≡ 2n−1 . Therefore there exists
c0 > 0 if and only if 2n−1 < 1 (one checks that γˆ < γˇ for all n ≥ 2), or equivalently n > 3,
otherwise c0 = 0 for all parameter values. Whenever c < c0 we have qP < q
∗
P ≤ q˜P and
(LLC ) binds. (Here q∗P ≤ q˜P is implied by γ ≤ inf {γˇ, 1}.) This is regime 3.
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(2) If qP > q˜P ≡ 1−cγ(n−1) best-reply profits are πdi (qP ) = 0 and (IC1) is identically equal to
(PC ). (This holds because f = 0, otherwise f > 0 would imply that (IC1) is strictly
weaker than (PC ).) It follows from the previous case (where qP ≤ q˜P ≡ 1−cγ(n−1)) that we
need only consider γ ≥ γˇ and n ≥ 6 to complete the analysis. There are two solutions in qP
to −π (qP ) = πdi (q∗m)− π∗m, the equation that defines qP implicitly. The first one is strictly
less than q˜P for all c < 1, therefore it is not admissible; the second one is then
qP =
1− c
4
2 [1 + γ(n− 1)] + [2 + γ(n− 1)]
p
1 + γ (n− 1)
[1 + γ(n− 1)]2
,
which we check is always strictly higher than q˜P . Then the threshold value for δ now is
δ =
µ
γ (n− 1)
2 + γ (n− 1)
¶2
< 1. (27)
This is Regime 2 (see (2)). Next, we find qP < (=)qP , so that the price pi(qP , qP ) is
non-negative and (LLC ) is slack if and only if c > (=)c00, with
c00 ≡
p
1 + γ(n− 1) [2 + γ(n− 1)]− 2 [1 + γ (n− 1)]p
1 + γ(n− 1) [2 + γ(n− 1)] + 2 [1 + γ(n− 1)]
. (28)
The frontier c00 intersects from below the line c = 0 if γ = 0, and c00 > 0 otherwise. Therefore
c00 > 0 for all γ ≥ γˇ. Whenever c < c00 we have qP < qP ≤ q
∗
P and (LLC ) binds. (Here
qP ≤ q∗P is implied by γ ≥ γˇ and n ≥ 6.) This is regime 3.
The two preceding paragraphs delineate the parameter subsets in which regimes 1 and 2 apply,
respectively. (In the latter case, since f = 0, note that (IC1) being identical to (PC ) implies that
regimes 1 and 2 coincide for all points (n, γ, c) verifying n ≥ 6, γˇ ≤ γ ≤ 1, and c00 ≤ c < 1.) All
points in the parameter set where regime 3 applies were also identified. In the latter regime, the
discount threshold δ solves πdi (q
∗
m) − π∗m = δ
³
π∗m − π
³
qP
´´
. As the specific algebraic form of
the latter expression does not depend on parameter values, for all n, γ, c there is a unique
δ =
1
4
µ
1− c
1 + c
¶2 (n− 1)2 γ2
1 + γ (n− 1) . (29)
It remains to compute δM , the discount threshold when (LLC ) binds and firms design the
optimal l-period punishment scheme. We know (from Proposition 4) that δM = sup{δ0, δ}. Again
we know from (24) there are two cases: 1) if qP < q˜P , or equivalently c <
1
1+γ(n−1) , we have
πdi
³
qP
´
= 14
³
1− c− γ (n− 1)) qP
´2
, which implies that
δM =
γ (n− 1) (1− c)2
(1 + c) [4 (1− c)− γ (n− 1) (3c− 1)] > δ; (30)
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and 2) if qP ≥ q˜P , or equivalently c ≥
1
1+γ(n−1) , we have π
d
i
³
qP
´
= 0, hence
δM =
µ
γ (n− 1)
2 + γ (n− 1)
¶2
, (31)
which is the same expression as δ (regime 2), an illustration of Proposition 5.
8.3.3 Partition of the parameter space
Finally, we may now use the obtained algebraic expressions to describe extensively the partition
of the parameter space (c, n, γ) in three subsets where either Regime 1, 2, or 3 apply, as follows:
1) Regime 1 applies if and only if
(i) 2 ≤ n ≤ 3; 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1; 0 ≤ c < 1; or
(ii) 4 ≤ n ≤ 5; 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1; c0 ≤ c < 1; or
(iii) 6 ≤ n; 0 ≤ γ ≤ γˆ; 0 ≤ c < 1; or
(iv) 6 ≤ n; γˆ ≤ γ ≤ γˇ; c0 ≤ c < 1.
2) Regime 2 applies if and only if
6 ≤ n; γˇ ≤ γ ≤ 1; c00 ≤ c < 1.
3) Regime 3 applies if and only if
(i) n = 3; γ = γˆ = 1; c = c = 0; or
(ii) 4 ≤ n ≤ 5; γˆ ≤ γ ≤ 1; 0 ≤ c ≤ c0; or
(iii) 6 ≤ n; γˆ ≤ γ ≤ γˇ; 0 ≤ c ≤ c0; or
(iv) 6 ≤ n; γˇ ≤ γ ≤ 1; 0 ≤ c ≤ c00.
At any point (n, γ, c) where Regime 3 applies (the grey area in Fig. 1), q∗m is implementable
for all δ ≥ δM . This illustrates Proposition 4. Next, as an illustration of Proposition 5, the
grey area can be partitioned into three subsets, which describe the consequences of introducing
a multi-period punishment scheme. For all points below the frontier c00 and above the frontier
q˜P = qP (so that q˜P ≤ qP together with f = 0 imply π
d
i
³
qP
´
= 0), we have δM = δ. Then firms
may implement am for all δ ≥ δM = δ with a multi-period punishment. Second, in the grey area
below the frontier q˜P = qP (in which case q˜P > qP implies π
d
i
³
qP
´
> 0) and for γ ≥ γˇ, we have
δM > δ. In that case firms cannot implement am for a discount level as low as δ. Eventually, for
γ < γˇ and below c0, we have qP < q
∗
P ≤ qP , hence δ∗ < δM < δ. In words, the limited liability
constraint binds, and several punishments with discounting are only an imperfect substitute for
more severity in the first period. The same figure also helps identifying the role of fixed costs.
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When f = 0, one can check that (IC1) simplifies to the same expression as (PC ). This does not
hold whenever f > 0.33 In that case all incentive constraints, together with the limited liability
constraint, remain unchanged. The only difference is that the future stream of profits earned
from the first period of punishment onward is reduced by the magnitude of fixed costs, so that
the participation constraint becomes stronger. Hence the parameter subset where regime 2 applies
expands. This has no impact on δ∗, δ, and δ, which correspond to each regime. ¥
8.4 Policy Implications
Proof of Lemma 5. First, we observe that aNE is implementable for aR = aNE. Second, we
show that, if an implementable am Â aNE exists, it cannot be equal to aR Â aNE.
(1) Set am = aR = aNE. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), given that aNE is a stage-game equilibrium, it can
be implemented repeatedly in all periods. (The participation constraint (PC ) is also satisfied for
all π(aNE) ≥ 0, the regulatory constraint (R) is exactly satisfied, as the two incentive constraints
(IC0-IC1) of the single period punishment scheme with aP = aNE .)
(2) Given δ, suppose that there exists an implementable am = aR, for a given aR Â aNE . We look
for a contradiction. In that case, recall that V0 (aP , δ) was defined in (5) as the continuation profit
earned by a firm from the first period of punishment onward. Then, the regulatory constraint (R)
implies that any punishment profile aP must satisfy V0 (aP , δ) ≥ π(aR)1−δ . Similarly, the continuation
profit with collusion is V0 (am, δ) = πm1−δ . It follows that aP must satisfy V0 (am, δ)− V0 (aP , δ) ≤
1
1−δ (πm − π (aR)). Moreover, recall from the first multi-period incentive constraint (3) that aP
must also satisfy πdi (am) − πm ≤ δ [V0 (am, δ)− V0 (aP , δ)]. It follows that, for am Â aNE to be
implementable with aP º (aR, . . . , aR) as a punishment profile, it must be the case that
πdi (am)− πm ≤
δ
1− δ (πm − π (aR)) . (32)
This condition is violated when am approaches aR, for all aR Â aNE. Indeed, on the LHS
limam→aR
¡
πdi (am)− πm
¢
> 0, while on the RHS limam→aR (πm − π (aR)) = 0. Hence necessarily
am Â aR. ¥
33 If f = 0 we have πdi (qP ) = −f = 0 for all qP ≥ q˜P = qˆP . In that case, the solution to the δ-minimization
problem in qP , under (IC0) and (IC1) only, is the same as the solution under (IC0) and (PC ). If f > 0 the
constraint (PC ) becomes stronger than (IC1) for all qP ≥ q˜P , with qˆP > q˜P (see assumptions (A5) and (A6)). We
may also assume that f < 0 to capture the existence of a profitable outside option. In this case (PC ) is weaker
than with a non-negative fixed cost.
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